New questions have emerged in the story regarding the purchase of the Russian bank Raiffeisen by Orban’s son-in-law: The real buyers could in fact be Russians that are close to the Kremlin and under sanctions.
Recently, several media have outlets published new details of a potential deal involving the Russian subsidiary of Raiffeisen Bank.
Recall that earlier it was said, in particular, that the son-in-law of the Hungarian Prime Minister, Istvan Tiborcz, was conducting serious negotiations with RBI, in which representatives of the Russian Central Bank and the Russian presidential administration were also participating.
Another supposed party to the deal was then the Hungarian OTP Bank (the parent structure of the Russian OTP Bank).was conducting serious negotiations with RBI, in which representatives of the Russian central bank and the Russian presidential administration were also involved. The Hungarian OTP Bank (the parent company of the Russian OTP Bank) was also named back than as another potential party in this deal.
However, there has been no confirmation of this, and Tiborcz’s company has commented that there is no interest in Russian assets. However, this statement seems strange in itself, considering that Tiborcz has common business interests with Russian entrepreneurs, even if he carefully hides these facts.
The fact that the CEO of the Austrian Raiffeisen Bank International, Johann Strobl, who was involved in all phases of the negotiations on this potential deal, did not give any details and did not comment on this decision also deserves special attention. However, his behavior does not surprise anyone, because according to well-informed sources, he has held several private meetings with several Russians who might be interested in buying the bank. The only problem is that the majority of these candidates are subject to sanctions in Europe and the USA – which is why Strobl cannot afford public discussions.
Of course, everyone officially denies the fact of the sale, but behind the scenes, work on the deal continues. And the very fact that the Hungarian side does not disclose the real beneficiaries of the deal may lead to subsequent investigations by the controlling law enforcement agencies. Thus, it is worth assuming that all potential participants in this deal, which will be discussed below, may be the objects of careful consideration for compliance with sanctions and criminal legislation.
Nevertheless, if one assumes that the Orbán son-in-law’s company has its eye on Raiffeisenbank’s Russian subsidiary, the question arises: who “recommended” this complex and controversial asset to Tiborcz, and why? It is worth remembering that Raiffeisen Russia is an asset with double toxicity: for the West, because it is the largest Western bank that continues to operate in Russia – and for Russia, because the structure is “Western” and controlled by Austria, making it vulnerable to capital outflows. Many market experts agree that it would be extremely advantageous for the Kremlin to nominally sell this asset to a “good” European company, but to gain de facto owners in Russia who are as loyal as possible, in order to legalize the asset and gain access to international financing. However, it has so far remained unclear who these Russian buyers hiding behind the façade of Tiborcz might be.
And even if there are no officially documented connections between Tiborcz and the Russian business world, Hungarian journalists have named one: Rahimkulov.
It is worth noting that the family of Megdet Rahimkulov – one of the most important Russian-Hungarian entrepreneurs – was already mentioned in the original Standard article, but only at the level of rumors. However, it has since emerged that they run a joint business, which is clearly proven by documents.
A closer look at corporate filings and management patterns reveals notable overlaps between István Tiborcz’s expanding empire and structures long associated with Russia’s Rahimkulov family. One particular link stands out: the acquisition of Waberer’s International Nyrt., a logistics giant, by Tiborcz — a deal recently confirmed. Corporate documents show that among the listed owners is not only a company from Tiborcz’s own group but also a firm tied to MOL, the energy conglomerate linked to the Rahimkulovs.
Subtle shifts in governance appear to support this convergence. Just months ago, Éva Hegedüs — a long-standing ally of Tiborcz — was quietly added to Waberer’s management board. Hegedüs is also the CEO of Gránit Bank, which plays a pivotal role in this narrative: it was this bank that Tiborcz acquired and through which he launched the financial wing of his business empire.
But the ties do not end there. Gránit Bank is legally the successor to Általános Értékforgalmi Bank (ÁÉB) — a financial institution that went through several waves of restructuring and ownership change, often tied to international political currents. For years, it was the Rahimkulovs who held a substantial stake in ÁÉB.
At the time of its most aggressive expansion, ÁÉB was managed by János Erős, a prominent figure in Hungary’s banking elite. Investigations reveal that Erős maintained close ties to Russian corporate interests, including at the height of his involvement with ÁÉB and in later strategic roles. One of his key accomplishments was brokering a joint deal with Gazprom for the South Stream gas pipeline project on Hungarian soil — a project mired in geopolitical controversy.
In light of this background, Erős’s recent reappearance as a facilitator in the potential sale of one of Austria’s most politically sensitive banking assets — Raiffeisen’s Russian subsidiary — raises serious questions. According to sources familiar with the matter, Erős is serving as a bridge between the Austrian stakeholders and Russian buyers hidden behind layers of Hungarian intermediaries.
This suggests a scenario in which Russian interests could continue operating Raiffeisen’s former assets in Russia, effectively shielding them from sanctions and reputational blowback by using Hungarian networks as a strategic buffer
But who are these representatives of the Kremlin?
Our sources report that the actual buyers using Orbán’s son-in-law as a cover may be Alexei Repik and Maxim Oreshkin.
Considering that Alexei Repik is a well-known Russian entrepreneur who owns numerous companies in various sectors – including finance, energy and medicine, it is fair to say that his business networks in both Russian and international financial circles make him a major player in big deals. Maxim Oreshkin, former Minister of Economic Development of Russia and one of the country’s leading economists, has an extensive network at the highest levels of government and financial structures.
His experience in economic management and dealing with large Russian companies makes him a valuable candidate for a deal that requires state support or influence. He could also easily secure the support of the Russian Central Bank for this venture.
The facts indicate that Repik and Oreshkin could indeed be the economic beneficiaries of this plan. After analyzing a complex network of dozens of offshore companies registered worldwide, important overlaps were identified.
Back to Mr. Tiborcz: the structure of his business empire appears to be “clean-washed” to the maximum on the outside, but some details about previous failed deals remain. As journalists have already pointed out, some offshore companies were involved in one of the corruption scandals in which Mr. Tiborcz’s companies were involved. The respective structures are outlined below:
One of the companies, BISKELOR ENTERPRISES LIMITED, is registered in GREG TOWER, Floor 6, 1065, NICOSIA (LEFKOSA) CYPRUS
And its director is, among others, EKAVI DIRECTORS LIMITED. And this in turn acts as the founder of a number of other offshore companies that have only one thing in common: They all had an agent, the scandalously famous one of the Panama Pappers, Mossack Fonseca. When this company was forced to close in 2018, the above-mentioned offshore companies were placed under the administration of WSC-Worldwide Corporate Secretarial Limited.
And what follows is an astonishing coincidence.
Because the aforementioned potential beneficiary of the fictitious deal to buy a Russian subsidiary of Raiffeisen Bank, Alexey Repik, has also founded several offshore companies. Among them was AMSELE Limited.
It’s secretary is the same as mentioned above: WCS-WORLDWIDE LIMITED. It is noteworthy that another offshore company directly linked to Mr. Repik, COMETRA SECURITIES INC., which used to be serviced by Fonseca’s agents as well, has changed its agent, now it is the same one employed by the companies of Orbán’s son-in-law.
And it seems that the only player in this system who has not acquired several companies in offshore zones with unclear ownership is Maxim Oreshkin.
Although it is more interesting that it was he who, as Minister of Economic Development of the Russian Federation, created the so-called “Russian offshore zones” in 2018, and one of the first oligarchs to benefit from them was Repik with one of his companies in the AMSELE group.
But Oreshkin’s role here is quite different: He is to ensure political approval in the Russian Federation so that the deal can be carried out “quietly” with the approval of the Central Bank of the Russian Federation.
At the same time, it is reported that in December 2024, the same “Hungarian” banker Janos Erős, who has already been mentioned, was seen several times at the Central Bank. It is not difficult to assume that he regularly informs the central bank about the progress of business preparations for his Russian “clients” from the Austrian and Hungarian side.
While direct ties between all the figures involved in the scheme remain unconfirmed, the intricate network of affiliated companies strongly suggests that, should the Russian subsidiary of Austria’s Raiffeisenbank International be transferred to István Tiborcz, it would effectively remain in Russia. Under the management of Maksim Oreshkin and Alexey Repik, the entity could continue operating in the Russian market, sidestepping sanctions and preserving a relatively “clean” European image — aided by Viktor Orbán’s favorable reputation on the continent.
While the interest of individual representatives of the Russian side seems relatively clear, the open question remains as to how this whole construct should be “sold” to the Austrian Raiffeisenbank board. And this is where Johann Strobl – the aforementioned CEO of the Austrian Raiffeisenbank – should be looked at again. Another no less controversial figure, who has long been associated with sanctions deals, Hungarian corruption networks and the Austrian political elite, is working on convincing the Russian buyers that they are the only possible buyers of the Russian subsidiary. This is the controversial Austro-Hungarian lobbyist Alfons Mensdorff-Pouilly.
The Austrian aristocrat and lobbyist was known for his interest in hunting and for organizing hunting events. He owned a castle in Luising (Burgenland), where he regularly organized large-scale hunting events attended by representatives of Austria’s political and business elite. Among his guests were personalities such as former Interior Minister Ernst Strasser and Vice-Chancellor Hubert Gorbach. Recently, it is reported that the aforementioned Johann Strobl has also been among the guests at these events.
However, Mensdorff-Pouilly became much better known through a corruption scandal worth over 12 million euros. It concerned the delivery of Saab Gripen fighter jets by BAE Systems to Hungary and the Czech Republic – a deal that he lobbied for by bribing officials.
After ten years of investigations, the charges against him were dropped – but only because BAE Systems itself cooperated with the investigating authorities and the evidence was insufficient.
But there was an interesting detail in this scandal: the lack of evidence arose solely because a parliamentary inquiry was launched in Hungary – following repeated requests from European politicians – the results of which are classified. All original documents relating to the procurement process have disappeared. And the Hungarian public prosecutor’s office, which is fully under the control of the prime minister, refused to hand them over.
Which is not surprising when you consider that it was Viktor Orbán himself who made the decision to buy the Gripen jets – against the recommendations of the military – at a time when Mensdorff-Pouilly was a paid lobbyist for BAE Systems in this very tender.
This represents a direct political interface. And the fact that the deal was conducted in a non-transparent manner, the documents disappeared and the parliamentary investigation remained secret only reinforces the arguments for informal collaboration.
In this context, it seems perfectly logical that Mensdorff-Pouilly is now doing everything in his power to convince Johann Strobl of the need to sell the Russian subsidiary of the Austrian Raiffeisenbank International to the shadow buyers Maxim Oreshkin and Alexei Repik, who are close to the Kremlin, using the pro-Russian Hungarian banker János Erős as the operative player and István Tiborcz, the son-in-law of Prime Minister Orbán, as the official front.
Main Image: By Biruitorul – Own work, Public Domain, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=4761399
