Western-built aircraft and components continue to reach Russia, Belarus and Iran through temporary registrations, intermediary companies and aviation hubs in the Gulf. Aircraft histories, sanctions records, company responses and testimony from aviation-market sources point to an international system designed to separate sellers and service providers from the aircraft’s eventual destination.
Sanctions imposed after Russia’s full-scale invasion of Ukraine were intended to deny Russian airlines access to Western aircraft, components, maintenance and technical support. Four years later, aircraft are still arriving and replacement parts are still entering the country.
Some jets pass through intermediary buyers. Others move between temporary registrations, spend weeks or months at airports in the United Arab Emirates or Oman, and then reappear under Russian, Belarusian or Iranian identities. Spare parts follow similar routes through trading companies based far beyond the sanctioned state.
This is no longer a collection of isolated transactions. It is an alternative aviation supply system.
Its methods resemble those of the maritime “shadow fleet” used to transport sanctioned oil: divided ownership, offshore companies, permissive jurisdictions and assets whose legal identity changes shortly before they reach their final operator.
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By the time an aircraft appears in Minsk, Moscow or Tehran, each previous participant can say that it no longer owns the asset, does not control its destination or dealt only with an apparently legitimate intermediary. Some of those explanations may be accurate. They also show why the system is difficult to stop.
Civil aviation and Russia’s war logistics
The first issue is the increasingly blurred boundary between Russia’s civilian air network and the logistical demands created by the war.
Photographs and videos published online have shown uniformed Russian servicemen travelling aboard commercial passenger aircraft, in some cases alongside ordinary passengers. Separate reporting found that the Russian Defence Ministry regularly chartered aircraft from civilian operators to move military personnel rapidly.
The airlines identified in the investigation included Ural Airlines, Abakan Air, Volga-Dnepr and Gelix Airlines. Ural Airlines was reported to have carried servicemen to southern transit hubs including Rostov-on-Don and occupied Simferopol.
The Aircraft Engineering aviation community has also highlighted allegations that civilian airlines, airports and charter operators are assisting the movement of personnel, equipment and restricted goods under the cover of ordinary passenger services.
A social-media post is not proof of a centrally directed military airlift. The allegations are, however, consistent with wider investigations into Russia’s use of civilian carriers for military transport, including the movement of troops and military-related cargo.
The overlap extends beyond passenger services. Satellite imagery has shown Russian military aircraft stationed at active civilian airports, while other investigations have examined the use of civilian aviation channels to obtain and move sanctioned components.
Scheduled civilian services can therefore move personnel towards southern Russia, maintain links with regions affected by wartime restrictions and supplement Russia’s dedicated military airlift capacity.
Russia’s civil aviation system has strategic value even when an individual flight remains formally commercial. By carrying passengers, personnel and cargo across the country, civilian airlines preserve transport capacity that would otherwise have to be provided by military aviation, rail or road.
Russia’s geography magnifies the importance of aviation. Aircraft connect distant regions, industrial centres and military-adjacent infrastructure separated by thousands of miles. Keeping the civilian fleet operational is therefore an economic and logistical priority for the Kremlin.
The parts pipeline through third countries
The US authorities have already documented part of the supply chain sustaining Russian aviation.
In December 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned A T S Heavy Equipment and Machinery Spare Parts Trading, stating that the Dubai-based business had delivered aircraft parts worth millions of dollars to Russia. The company was designated for operating in the aerospace sector of the Russian economy.
The same action named other UAE-based entities accused of moving aviation equipment to Russia. These included AMC Service FZE, Aspect DWC LLC, Griffon FZC and Skyparts FZCO. The Treasury said the companies had shipped aircraft parts, components or equipment to Russian customers.
Independent customs research has identified a broader system. Investigate Europe found that components distributed by Boeing, Airbus subsidiary Satair, SuperJet International and more than 100 European and American suppliers reached Russia through Indian intermediaries. The investigation did not suggest that the original Western manufacturers necessarily knew the goods’ final destination. It showed how control can be lost after components enter international resale chains.
A United24 Media investigation has separately examined the routes through which Western-made aircraft components continue to reach Russian operators.
Previous investigations have identified customers from the Aeroflot Group, including Aeroflot, Rossiya and Pobeda, as well as S7 Airlines, among the Russian carriers benefiting from imported Western components.
The movement of parts is now accompanied by the transfer of complete aircraft.
Former SkyUp Boeings surface in Belarus
Three Boeing 737-800 aircraft formerly operated under lease by the Ukrainian carrier SkyUp provide a clear example of how aircraft can pass through intermediary registrations before appearing in a sanctioned market.
The aircraft carry manufacturer’s serial numbers 40153, 40151 and 40146. Aviation records confirm that they previously operated for SkyUp under the registrations UR-SQB, UR-SQF and UR-SQC respectively. The three aircraft were among the Boeing 737s formerly authorised for SkyUp’s international operations.
SkyUp told our correspondent that it returned all three aircraft to their lessor in January 2026. Between March and May, they were removed from the Ukrainian and Maltese registers.
“Since then, these aircraft have neither physically nor legally been part of the SkyUp fleet, and any subsequent decisions regarding them have had no connection whatsoever to the activities of the SkyUp brand,” the company said.
SkyUp’s response establishes where its responsibility ended. It does not identify the lessor, the subsequent buyer or the broker responsible for arranging the aircraft’s onward movement.
Aviation reporting on the transaction found that the three aircraft were transferred through Dubai and placed on the Gambian register before being flown to Minsk. Temporary Gambian registrations allowed the aircraft to move between their previous registrations and their subsequent entry into Belarusian service.
At least two have since appeared in Belavia’s operational fleet. Aircraft MSN 40151, formerly operated by SkyUp as UR-SQF, entered service with the Belarusian registration EW-548PA. Its registration history and current operation by Belavia are recorded in international aircraft databases.
Aircraft MSN 40146, formerly UR-SQC, subsequently appeared as EW-546PA. Aircraft tracking records identify it as an active Belavia Boeing 737-800, while aviation reporting confirmed that it had begun operating regular Belavia services by June 2026.
The status of the third aircraft, MSN 40153, should be described separately until its final Belarusian registration and entry into service are confirmed by equally clear registration records.
The sequence is difficult to dismiss as routine administration. Aircraft previously operated under Ukrainian and Maltese registrations were returned to a lessor, moved through the United Arab Emirates, placed temporarily on a third-country register and then delivered to the national airline of Russia’s closest military ally.
Belavia is Belarus’s state-owned flag carrier. The airline has already used intermediary ownership and registration arrangements to replenish its fleet after Western sanctions restricted access to aircraft, spare parts and maintenance. A Reuters investigation into earlier Belavia acquisitions documented how aircraft sold to a UAE buyer and connected to a little-known Gambian operator eventually reached Minsk.
Belavia operates direct services between Minsk and Kaliningrad. The airline’s own ticket promotions confirm the Minsk–Kaliningrad connection, while current schedules show regular direct flights between the two cities.
Kaliningrad is a Russian exclave situated between Poland and Lithuania. Direct flights from Belarus enable passengers and cargo to travel between Minsk and the exclave without entering EU territory.
The strategic value of the route is apparent even without knowing the contents of individual flights. The additional Boeing 737s expand Belavia’s overall passenger and cargo capacity and strengthen air connections between Belarus and Russia, including Kaliningrad.
The available evidence supports the identity of the aircraft, their former operation by SkyUp, the Gambian registration stage and the entry of at least two into Belavia service. It does not presently establish that the aircraft carried military cargo or goods specifically intended for the Russian armed forces.
Questions raised in the European Parliament
The companies operating around these supply routes have also attracted attention in Brussels.
Two Members of the European Parliament submitted a formal written question to the European Commission concerning eight aviation businesses alleged to have been involved in supplying aircraft or aviation components to Russia.
The companies named were Golden Falcon Aviation FZE; Casper Aviation Spares Trading FZE; U.C.A Aviation Spares Trading FZE; Aerospace Technical Services; A T S Heavy Equipment and Machinery Spare Parts Trading; Aeroparts AOG; Royal Aircraft Maintenance Company; and Sky Asia Technics LLC.
The MEPs asked the Commission to examine the activities of the companies and to consider whether further restrictive measures were required. The question places the named entities before the EU executive through a formal parliamentary procedure and requires the Commission to respond to concerns about possible aviation-related sanctions circumvention.
A written question is not, in itself, a finding of wrongdoing. It is, however, an official request for scrutiny and possible action against companies alleged to be operating within supply chains serving sanctioned Russian aviation.
The inclusion of A T S Heavy Equipment and Machinery Spare Parts Trading LLC is particularly notable because the Dubai-based company had already been targeted by Washington.
In December 2023, the US Treasury designated the company under Executive Order 14024, stating that it had delivered millions of dollars’ worth of aircraft parts to Russia. The company was designated for operating or having operated in the aerospace sector of the Russian economy.
The company was also added to the US Office of Foreign Assets Control’s Specially Designated Nationals list, where it is identified as a UAE-registered entity operating from Dubai under licence number 770917.
The Treasury action did not concern every company named in the parliamentary question. It nevertheless shows that the MEPs’ concerns overlap with an aviation supply network in which at least one named entity had already been formally identified by US sanctions authorities as supplying aircraft parts to Russia.
Earlier investigations into A T S Heavy Equipment and Machinery also linked its deliveries to major Russian carriers. Reporting on Russian aviation supply chains said aircraft parts routed through the company had been supplied to airlines including Aeroflot, Rossiya, Pobeda and S7.
The parliamentary question therefore goes beyond a general expression of concern. It brings together companies operating in aircraft trading, maintenance and spare-parts supply and asks the Commission to assess whether their activities justify further EU restrictive measures.
The companies have not been found guilty of sanctions violations through the parliamentary process. They have, however, been formally placed before the European Commission for scrutiny over alleged links to supply routes serving Russian aviation.
Pressure on media reporting
The aviation transactions have also prompted disputes over how they are reported.
Imad Eddine Elhalabi and Royal Aircraft Maintenance Company, or RAMC, have challenged articles concerning alleged aircraft and component supplies to Russian operators. Western and Ukrainian publications have received demands to amend or remove coverage, and some reports have subsequently disappeared from public view.
Our correspondent has previously documented legal demands and private communications sent after the publication of reporting on Russia’s shadow aviation supply chains. That reporting drew on contracts, invoices, purchase orders, freight records and aviation documents linked to dealings with Russian carriers.
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Sources familiar with the dispute said Ukrainian journalists and media organisations were also contacted over articles concerning Elhalabi, RAMC and related aviation transactions. According to those sources, the approaches were coordinated in Kyiv by people associated with a local Arabic-language publication.
Channel 5 Ukraine later removed an article connected with the dispute. The reason for the editorial decision has not been publicly established, but the removal followed complaints concerning the report.
A company or individual is entitled to challenge inaccurate reporting and seek correction. The editorial concern arises where repeated legal demands and private approaches result in articles being removed before the underlying transactions have been fully examined.
The disputes do not resolve the central questions raised by the documents and aircraft movements. Those questions depend on contracts, payments, registration histories, freight records and the identity of the final operators.
The allegations concerning Imad Eddine Elhalabi
A source with direct knowledge of aircraft trading in the Middle East told our correspondent that Imad Eddine Elhalabi was involved in marketing three former SkyUp Boeing 737-800 aircraft before their transfer to Belarus.
The aircraft carry manufacturer’s serial numbers 40153, 40151 and 40146. Aviation records confirm that they were previously operated by SkyUp under the registrations UR-SQB, UR-SQF and UR-SQC.
Commercial documents examined in earlier reporting identified Imad El Eddine Mohamed El Halabi as manager of Aeroparts AOG DWC-LLC and placed companies associated with him in separate dealings involving Russian aviation counterparties.
Those documents establish Elhalabi’s activity within the regional aircraft-parts market. They do not independently link him to MSNs 40153, 40151 and 40146.
No public sale contract, broker’s mandate, invoice, payment record or aircraft-registration document currently names Elhalabi in connection with those three transfers. The allegation that he marketed the aircraft therefore rests on the account of a source familiar with the transaction.
Another Airbus reaches Russia
On May 15, 2026, an Airbus A320-232 arrived at Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport under the Russian registration RA-73899.
The aircraft, manufacturer’s serial number 4934, was built in 2011 and originally delivered to Etihad Airways as A6-EIO. It later passed to GA Telesis, operated for Air Albania as ZA-MMK and subsequently carried the registration VQ-CEK. Its full operator and registration history is recorded in international aircraft databases.
After leaving Air Albania, the aircraft returned to GA Telesis and was stored at Istanbul Atatürk Airport from December 2025. On April 14, 2026, it was flown to Muscat, where it remained for one month before making a delivery flight to Moscow on May 15. The route and registration change were documented in aviation reporting published after its arrival in Russia.
The specialist aviation channel Aviation Mezzanine identified North-West Air Company, also known as Severo-Zapad, as the aircraft’s new owner. Aircraft databases and live flight-tracking records now list North-West Air Company as the operator.
The records establish the aircraft’s identity, its previous operation by Etihad Airways and Air Albania, its return to GA Telesis, its movement through Muscat and its subsequent appearance in Russia under a new registration.
They do not establish that GA Telesis knowingly sold or supplied the aircraft to a Russian operator. The publicly visible record does not identify the intermediate purchaser, the payment structure or the contractual arrangements under which the aircraft moved from the GA Telesis portfolio to North-West Air Company.
The sequence nevertheless exposes a weakness in sanctions enforcement. A Western-built aircraft can leave a previous operator, pass through storage and intermediary ownership, travel through a third-country aviation hub and emerge in Moscow without a transparent account of the buyer or financing mechanism.
Detailed airframe records show that the aircraft was stored in Istanbul until April 14, remained in Muscat from April 15 until May 15 and was then ferried directly to Vnukovo for delivery to its new operator.
North-West Air Company had already obtained another Airbus A320-family aircraft after sanctions were imposed. Its current fleet includes the A320neo registered RA-73889, alongside the newly delivered RA-73899 and several Airbus A321 aircraft. The airline’s recorded fleet history indicates that the latest A320 was not an isolated addition.
The use of Muscat also follows a pattern seen in other aircraft transfers to Russia and Belarus. Aviation reporting on RA-73899 noted that Western-built aircraft have repeatedly passed through Oman before appearing in sanctioned aviation markets.
The central unanswered question is what happened between the aircraft’s departure from the GA Telesis portfolio and its arrival in Moscow. The intermediate ownership, contractual chain and financing arrangements remain outside the public record.
Atitech, Lebanon Sky and the Muscat maintenance connection
The investigation also examined Lebanon Sky Airline DWC-LLC and its proposed dealings with the Italian maintenance company Atitech.
Atitech told our correspondent that it entered an agreement with Lebanon Sky in July 2024 to provide maintenance services for two Airbus A330-243 aircraft, manufacturer serial numbers 491 and 525.
The two aircraft were expected to be ferried from Muscat to Atitech’s facilities at Rome Fiumicino. Lebanon Sky was required to pay a reservation fee and a further portion of the contract price before work began.
According to Atitech, the payments were not made. The aircraft never reached Italy, no maintenance work took place and lawyers were instructed to recover the outstanding sum.
Atitech added:
“We never sold or purchased any aircraft to or from Lebanon Sky nor to or from Mr Eddine cited in your letter.”
The correspondence establishes that Lebanon Sky sought European maintenance capacity for two wide-bodied aircraft positioned in Muscat. It also establishes that the arrangement collapsed over non-payment.
Atitech’s response concerns the two Airbus A330s. It does not connect the Italian company to RA-73899, which is an Airbus A320.
Muscat’s repeated appearance remains important. It served as the location from which the Lebanon Sky aircraft were expected to travel to Italy, and it was also the last recorded stop before RA-73899 entered Russia.
That does not prove that the transactions were connected. It shows that Oman has become a recurring staging point in movements involving aircraft later associated with sanctioned markets.
[EDITORIAL NOTE — NOT FOR PUBLICATION: Keep the Lebanon Sky–Atitech agreement as a separate case. Do not imply that Atitech sold, serviced or transferred RA-73899. The evidence supports a wider observation about Muscat’s recurring role, not a direct connection between the aircraft.]
Who controls Lebanon Sky?
The beneficial ownership of Lebanon Sky Airline DWC-LLC and the similarly named Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL is not fully disclosed in the public record.
The Atitech agreement concerns Lebanon Sky Airline DWC-LLC, which presents itself as a UAE-based company operating from Dubai South. The SAL designation, by contrast, normally denotes a Lebanese joint-stock company. The use of similar commercial names does not by itself establish that the two entities are legally identical or share the same ownership structure.
Public business records nevertheless point towards Mohamad Hasan Wehbe. A commercial profile of Mohamad Wehbeidentifies him as the owner of Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL, Seven Seas SAL Offshore and Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L. A LinkedIn profile associated with the same name likewise lists ownership of Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL and the two Seven Seas companies.
That overlap is important because the US Treasury formally identified Mohamad Hasan Wehbe as the owner and operator of Seven Seas SAL Offshore and Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L. when it designated him in March 2026. Treasury said the companies were used by Alaa Hassan Hamieh for procurement and money laundering and designated Wehbe for allegedly providing material support to Hamieh.
The US sanctions notice does not mention Lebanon Sky. It does, however, independently confirm Wehbe’s control of the same two Seven Seas companies that public profiles list alongside Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL.
The available evidence therefore supports a substantial link between Mohamad Hasan Wehbe and Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL, although it does not yet establish the precise relationship between that Lebanese company and Lebanon Sky Airline DWC-LLC in the UAE.
The distinction matters because the Atitech contract was signed with the UAE entity. Establishing common control would require a UAE trade licence, Lebanese company extract, shareholder declaration, beneficial-ownership filing or authenticated corporate agreement linking the two businesses.
For now, the strongest supported conclusion is that Mohamad Hasan Wehbe has been publicly identified as the owner of Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL and is officially recorded by the US authorities as the owner and operator of the two Seven Seas companies listed alongside it in business profiles. The ownership of Lebanon Sky Airline DWC-LLC remains less transparent.
What is firmly documented is Mohamad Hasan Wehbe’s role in a separate network identified by the US Treasury.
On March 20, 2026, Washington imposed sanctions on a network of 16 individuals and entities that it said had helped divert more than $100 million through schemes benefiting Hizballah since 2020. The action was taken under Executive Order 13224, the principal US counter-terrorism sanctions authority.
The Treasury identified Mohamad Hasan Wehbe as the owner and operator of Lebanon-based Seven Seas SAL Offshore and Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L.
According to the US authorities, the two companies were used by Alaa Hassan Hamieh for procurement and money laundering in collaboration with other businesses controlled by Hamieh, including Calllync S.A.L. Offshore.
The Treasury described Hamieh as a Hizballah financier who controlled companies through relatives and close associates. It said the network had been involved in commercial projects in Lebanon, Syria, Poland, Slovenia, Qatar and Canada, and had generated or diverted funds for Hizballah’s finance team.
Washington also identified Daniel Hamieh, Alaa Hamieh’s nephew, as a co-owner with him of the Poland-based Calllync Spółka z Ograniczoną Odpowiedzialnością, generally shortened to Calllync Sp. z o.o.
The Treasury said the Polish company had sent hundreds of thousands of dollars to a business affiliated with what it described as the Hizballah finance team.
Mohamad Hasan Wehbe and Daniel Hamieh were designated for allegedly providing material support to Alaa Hassan Hamieh. Calllync S.A.L. Offshore was designated as a company owned, controlled or directed by Alaa Hamieh, while Calllync Sp. z o.o. was designated as an entity owned, controlled or directed by Daniel Hamieh.
Seven Seas SAL Offshore and Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L. were designated because they were owned or controlled by Wehbe. Their inclusion on the US Specially Designated Nationals list means that property and interests in property subject to US jurisdiction are blocked and US persons are generally prohibited from dealing with them.
The OFAC records provide further identifying details. Seven Seas SAL Offshore is registered at the Airport Business Center on Airport Road in Beirut, while Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L. is registered at the Airport Business Center in Bourj Barajneh. Both companies were established in July 2012 and are formally linked in the sanctions record to Mohamad Hasan Wehbe.
These are official US allegations accompanied by formal sanctions designations. They establish Wehbe’s ownership and operation of the Seven Seas companies and Washington’s allegation that they formed part of a procurement and financial network serving Hamieh.
The designation does not, by itself, establish that Wehbe controlled Lebanon Sky, participated in the Atitech maintenance agreement or had any role in the aircraft transferred to Belarus or Russia. Those questions require separate corporate and transactional evidence.
Iran’s Boeing 777 route
The Iran case provides the clearest evidence that the alternative aviation supply system can move not merely components, but complete long-range aircraft.
Five former Saudia Boeing 777-200ER aircraft were reported to have reached, or to be in the process of reaching, Iran’s sanctioned Mahan Air.
Saudia said the aircraft had been sold on June 7, 2023, to a company registered outside Saudi Arabia and that it had no subsequent operational or commercial relationship with them. The statement rejected the suggestion that Saudia had supplied the aircraft directly to Mahan Air.
That explanation may accurately describe Saudia’s role. It does not explain how the aircraft subsequently moved from the overseas buyer towards Iran.
The intermediary identified in aviation reporting is ECT Aviation Support, a company established in Sharjah in 2018. Aircraft databases connect ECT with several former Saudia Boeing 777-200ERs that later carried Gambian registrations beginning with “C5”, including aircraft recorded as C5-ECJ, C5-LTH and C5-ECT.
Other aircraft records identify further former Saudia Boeing 777s associated with ECT Aviation Support, including manufacturer’s serial numbers 28346 and 28347.
The scale of the acquisition is important. ECT was associated with a pool of large, long-range aircraft requiring substantial capital, technical preparation and continued access to replacement components. Several were stored or moved through aviation centres in the United Arab Emirates and Oman before their reported transfer towards Iran.
The use of Gambian registrations created an administrative interval between the aircraft leaving Saudia’s fleet and their reported appearance in Iranian service. A Gambian registration is not evidence of wrongdoing, but it can make the ownership and operational chain more difficult to follow when combined with rapid transfers between jurisdictions.
The most authoritative evidence came from Washington. On April 21, 2026, the US Treasury identified two Boeing 777-200ER aircraft, EP-MTE and EP-MTB, as owned and operated by Mahan Air.
The corresponding OFAC designation records identify EP-MTB as manufacturer’s serial number 28527 and EP-MTE as serial number 33369. Both aircraft were added to the US sanctions list as property in which Mahan Air has an interest.
Those serial numbers do not match the former Saudia aircraft identified in the ECT Aviation records reviewed above. The Treasury action therefore confirms that Mahan Air obtained and operated Boeing 777s, but it does not establish that EP-MTE and EP-MTB were among the five former Saudia aircraft linked to ECT.
In the same sanctions action, Washington designated Dubai-based Chabok FZCO, also known as Chabok Aviation. The Treasury alleged that the company had facilitated the procurement of sensors and other US-origin aircraft components for Mahan Air in Iran.
The action establishes two parts of the supply system: Mahan Air had obtained and was operating Boeing 777 aircraft, while a UAE-based company was accused of procuring US-origin components needed to support its aviation operations.
Mahan Air has been sanctioned by Washington since 2011. The Treasury says the airline provided financial, material and technological support to the Islamic Revolutionary Guard Corps-Quds Force and has been involved in transporting weapons and military-related cargo.
The aircraft acquisition therefore has implications beyond ordinary fleet renewal. Boeing 777s give Mahan Air additional long-range passenger and cargo capacity, while the Chabok designation shows the continuing importance of Gulf-based procurement channels for obtaining the US-origin equipment required to keep Iranian aircraft operating.
The precise relationship between the former Saudia aircraft associated with ECT Aviation Support and the Boeing 777s formally identified by OFAC remains unresolved. What is established is that complete wide-bodied aircraft and the components needed to maintain them continue to reach Mahan Air through supply chains extending beyond Iran.
Who stands behind ECT Aviation Support?
Sources consulted by our correspondent identify the Egyptian businessmen Ibrahim Mukhtar and Husam Mukhtar as figures behind ECT Aviation Support, with Husam described as directing a US branch or related operation.
The sources also say that the brothers acquired Boeing aircraft during the Covid period and arranged the technical work required to return them to service.
Public aviation records support ECT Aviation Support’s association with a group of former Saudia Boeing 777-200ER aircraft. Fleet records describe ECT Aviation Support as a UAE company founded in 2018 and connect it to several wide-bodied aircraft carrying Gambian registrations.
Individual airframe histories identify former Saudia Boeing 777s subsequently associated with ECT, including C5-ECJ, formerly HZ-AKJ, C5-LTH, formerly HZ-AKL, and C5-ECS, formerly HZ-AKS.
The available corporate evidence is less conclusive. Publicly accessible records reviewed for this article do not establish the beneficial ownership of ECT Aviation Support or confirm the precise legal status of any US branch linked to the company.
A public professional profile identifies Mahran Ibrahim as the founder and chief executive of ECT Aviation Support. Posts associated with the same profile also place him publicly at the head of the company’s business activities.
That creates an unresolved discrepancy with the source account naming Ibrahim and Husam Mukhtar. The sources may be referring to investors, intermediaries or individuals whose roles are not disclosed in public company material, but the currently available records do not establish that.
Ownership remains important because it would identify the people controlling a business associated with a substantial pool of former Saudia wide-bodied aircraft before Boeing 777s began appearing in Iranian service.
ECT’s limited public profile also raises questions about the commercial purpose of the operation. A relatively young company became associated with several expensive long-range aircraft requiring substantial capital, maintenance, engine support and continued access to certified replacement components.
The timing warrants scrutiny because the aircraft were accumulated while Iran was seeking to renew a long-haul fleet constrained by sanctions and restricted access to US-origin aviation technology. It does not, on its own, prove that ECT was established specifically to conceal aircraft transfers to Iran.
The strongest conclusion supported by the public record is that ECT Aviation Support was associated with several former Saudia Boeing 777s, some of which passed through Gambian registration and aviation hubs in the United Arab Emirates. The company’s beneficial ownership, financing and relationship with the aircraft’s eventual operators remain unresolved.
The reported role of Ibrahim and Husam Mukhtar should therefore remain attributed to sources unless supported by a Sharjah trade licence, incorporation documents, shareholder records, signed company material or another authenticated corporate record.
Gambia’s recurring role
Gambia appears repeatedly in aircraft movements involving sanctioned markets.
The clearest documented example concerns Belarus. A Reuters investigation into Belavia’s acquisition of three Airbus A330 aircraft found that the aircraft had been registered to the little-known Gambian company Magic Air before arriving in Minsk. Gambia’s Civil Aviation Authority told Reuters that Magic Air had sold the aircraft to a buyer in the United Arab Emirates and requested permission to ferry them to Belarus before removing them from the Gambian register.
The pattern appeared again when three Boeing 737-800s formerly operated by SkyUp moved towards Belavia. Aviation reporting traced the aircraft through temporary Gambian registrations before they emerged under Belarusian marks and entered commercial service.
Gambian registrations have also appeared in aircraft transfers to Iran. In 2024, two Airbus A340-600 aircraft travelled from Lithuania towards Iran while carrying C5 registrations. A third aircraft was stopped after authorities discovered that the first two had landed in Iran rather than at the declared destination in the Philippines. The episode was subsequently examined in research on sanctions-evasion methods used by Iran’s aviation sector.
US sanctions authorities later targeted Macka Invest Company Limited, a Gambian business accused of involvement in the A340 transfers. The two aircraft that reached Iran had carried Gambian registrations before being redesignated for Iranian operation.
A further case involved the Gambian-registered Embraer business jet C5-SKY. A Reuters investigation into the removal of assets from Syria during the collapse of Bashar al-Assad’s government found that the aircraft was used for flights between Syria, Russia and the United Arab Emirates. Gambian corporate records reviewed by Reuters identified a locally registered company connected to the aircraft.
A Gambian registration is not inherently evidence of wrongdoing. Aircraft change registers for leasing, storage, ferry operations, financing and ownership transfers.
The concern lies in the repeated sequence. Valuable aircraft leave established operators, acquire C5 registrations for a limited period and then appear in countries subject to extensive aviation restrictions.
In the Belarusian cases, the Gambian registration covered the interval between the aircraft’s previous commercial ownership and their entry into Belavia’s fleet. In the Iranian cases, C5 registrations appeared during movements in which the declared or apparent destination did not correspond with the aircraft’s eventual arrival in Iran.
The register therefore occupies the least transparent stage of several transactions: the period after an aircraft leaves its former operator but before its final owner or destination becomes publicly visible.
That makes Gambia’s aircraft register an important subject for regulators examining sanctions circumvention. Authorities should establish who applied for each registration, who was declared as beneficial owner and operator, which end-user and destination were supplied to the registry, and whether the aircraft followed the route described in the application.
The issue is not the nationality of the registration itself. It is whether temporary registration is being used to conceal the identity of the purchaser, interrupt the public ownership trail or facilitate delivery to an operator that could not have acquired the aircraft directly.
Maintenance infrastructure in Sharjah
The former Saudia aircraft required substantial technical work before they could return to service. Sources familiar with the transactions say that heavy maintenance was carried out in Sharjah, although the available public record does not identify the maintenance provider for each aircraft.
Sharjah has the infrastructure required for such work. Gulf Aircraft and Engineering Services, or GAES, advertises heavy and line maintenance, engine services, aircraft painting, cabin modifications and non-destructive testing. The company says its engineers have experience with Boeing 737, 747 and 777 aircraft, as well as the Airbus A320 and A330 families.
GAES describes itself as an independent maintenance, repair and overhaul provider based near Sharjah International Airport. Its hangar can accommodate eight Boeing 737 or Airbus A320-sized aircraft and two wide-bodied aircraft of the Boeing 747 or 777 class at the same time.
The Sharjah Airport Authority identifies GAES as one of the maintenance providers operating at the airport, alongside facilities serving commercial and general aviation.
Sharjah’s aviation maintenance sector also contains infrastructure originally established by Russia’s Volga-Dnepr Group.
Volga-Dnepr opened a major maintenance operation in the emirate under the name Volga-Dnepr Gulf. Aviation Week reported in 2013 that the Russian group had established a 22,000-square-metre hangar at Sharjah International Airport to maintain aircraft and components. The facility was designed to serve both Volga-Dnepr aircraft and third-party customers.
The group expanded the Sharjah operation in 2021, when a new maintenance hangar was formally opened at the airport.
The company now trading as MRO Gulf states that it was formerly known as Volga-Dnepr Gulf UAE FZC and was rebranded in 2022. Its corporate website says that the business is operating under new management and ownership while restructuring its activities and seeking to re-enter the aviation market.
Industry records similarly identify MRO Gulf as the operation rebranded from Volga-Dnepr Gulf, which had formed part of the Volga-Dnepr Group’s maintenance division.
This establishes the existence in Sharjah of substantial maintenance infrastructure with the capacity to work on large Western-built aircraft, including Boeing 777s. It also confirms that part of that infrastructure originated within the commercial network of Russia’s Volga-Dnepr Group.
It does not establish that GAES and MRO Gulf are the same company. Public records present them as separate maintenance businesses operating in Sharjah.
Nor does the available evidence identify which company serviced the former Saudia Boeing 777s associated with ECT Aviation Support. No work order, invoice, technical log, release-to-service certificate or hangar record reviewed for this article names GAES or MRO Gulf as the provider responsible for those aircraft.
The strongest conclusion supported by the record is that the aircraft underwent, or required, substantial technical preparation in an aviation centre capable of handling Boeing 777 maintenance. Sharjah hosts both GAES and MRO Gulf, the latter being the rebranded former Volga-Dnepr Gulf operation.
Identifying the company that carried out the work would require maintenance contracts, technical logs, invoices, hangar photographs or certificates releasing the aircraft back into service.
Mikhail Khoroshaev
Mikhail Khoroshaev has been identified as a former senior figure associated with Volga-Dnepr’s aircraft-maintenance activities in the United Arab Emirates.
A public professional profile describes Khoroshaev as a former executive vice-president of Volga-Dnepr Technics and Volga-Dnepr Gulf, with responsibility for maintenance, repair and overhaul operations in the UAE, Germany and Moscow. The profile states that he oversaw MRO businesses generating approximately $100 million in sales.
A separate professional listing identifies a Mikhail Khoroshaev as a former deputy product manager at Volga-Dnepr Gulf in the UAE. Although public profiles should not be treated as corporate filings, they support his association with the group’s Sharjah maintenance operation.
Volga-Dnepr’s maintenance network extended across Russia, Germany and the UAE. The group operated component-repair and aircraft-maintenance facilities in those markets, including a large MRO complex at Sharjah International Airport.
The Sharjah facility was capable of accommodating up to six narrow-bodied aircraft or two large freighters simultaneously. Volga-Dnepr Gulf represented the group’s maintenance division in the Middle East and planned to expand its capabilities to include Boeing 777 and Airbus A330 aircraft.
A source familiar with the ECT Aviation Support transactions identified Khoroshaev as a figure who was aware of the maintenance arrangements involving the former Saudia Boeing 777s.
The source alleged that Khoroshaev’s previous position within the Volga-Dnepr maintenance structure gave him knowledge of, or access to, the facilities and personnel required to prepare the aircraft for return to service.
His professional history makes the allegation relevant. It does not establish that he personally authorised, negotiated or arranged maintenance for the ECT aircraft.
The timing also requires care. Volga-Dnepr Gulf was later restructured and rebranded under new management and ownership. The presently available evidence does not show that Khoroshaev remained in operational control when the reported work on the former Saudia aircraft took place.
No maintenance contract, work order, technical log, invoice, release-to-service certificate or company correspondence reviewed for this article names Khoroshaev in connection with the ECT Boeing 777s.
The strongest supported conclusion is therefore that Khoroshaev previously held a senior role within the Volga-Dnepr maintenance network, including its UAE activities, and was identified by a source as a person familiar with the ECT maintenance arrangements.
Establishing a direct role would require testimony based on personal involvement or documentary evidence showing that he approved, negotiated, supervised or facilitated the work.
Ksenia Khoroshaeva and the alleged Neo Parts connection
Sources further allege that Mikhail Khoroshaev and his wife, Ksenia Khoroshaeva, are connected to a Sharjah aircraft-parts business referred to as Neo Parts, and that the operation has supplied components to Russian aviation customers.
If documented, the allegation would connect people with experience inside an established Russian aviation-maintenance network to a Gulf-based parts supplier operating after Western sanctions restricted direct sales to Russia.
Ksenia Khoroshaeva has a documented professional background in aviation sales. A public career profile identifies her as an aviation sales manager covering the Middle East and the Commonwealth of Independent States. It states that she has managed airline customers in the UAE, Oman and Bahrain, as well as customers across former Soviet markets.
The same profile records that she previously worked for Skyways Technics in Dubai, where her responsibilities included aircraft spare-parts sales. It also lists earlier marketing and business-development experience at Volga-Dnepr Gulf, placing her professionally within the Sharjah aviation-maintenance environment examined in the preceding section.
Mikhail Khoroshaev’s own public professional record describes experience procuring aircraft equipment and spare parts, including the documentation and quality-control requirements associated with heavy maintenance for Boeing 747, Boeing 737 and Airbus A320 aircraft.
Those records establish that both individuals have experience relevant to aircraft maintenance, components and aviation customers in the Gulf and former Soviet markets. They do not establish that they own or operate a company called Neo Parts.
Public searches identify UAE aviation businesses using similar “Neo” names, but the material reviewed for this article does not conclusively show which legal entity the sources meant. Nor does it identify a Sharjah trade licence, corporate registration, shareholder filing or company website naming Ksenia Khoroshaeva as an owner, director or manager.
No invoice, customs declaration, airway bill, purchase order or payment record reviewed for this article shows a Neo-branded company supplying a sanctioned Russian carrier.
The allegation therefore remains an important but unresolved line of inquiry. The professional histories of Mikhail and Ksenia Khoroshaeva make their possible involvement in a Gulf aviation-parts business relevant, particularly given Russia’s continued dependence on Western-built aircraft and certified components.
The available evidence does not yet support stating that the Khoroshaevs control Neo Parts or that the company supplied sanctioned Russian airlines. The allegation rests on source testimony pending identification of the company’s complete legal name and supporting transaction records.
A separate investigation should establish the company’s trade name and licence number, shareholders, directors, registered address, banking relationships, principal suppliers and Russian customers. It should also seek invoices, export declarations, freight records and end-user documents showing whether parts were ultimately delivered to Russian airlines or maintenance organisations subject to sanctions.
EASA and the European regulatory question
The Sharjah maintenance operation formerly associated with Volga-Dnepr also had a formal relationship with the European Union Aviation Safety Agency, or EASA.
An EASA list of approved foreign Part-145 maintenance organisations dated April 2021 identified Volga-Dnepr Gulf (UAE) FZC as a valid organisation under approval number EASA.145.0650. The record confirms that the Sharjah operation had previously obtained European approval to perform maintenance within the scope of the Part-145 system.
Part-145 approval allows a maintenance organisation outside the EU to carry out specified work and issue documentation recognised under European aviation-safety rules. Such approval can provide access to European customers and confer commercial credibility beyond the organisation’s home jurisdiction.
The company now trading as MRO Gulf says it was formerly known as Volga-Dnepr Gulf and was rebranded in 2022 under new management and ownership. The historical EASA record, however, is in the name of Volga-Dnepr Gulf (UAE) FZC, not MRO Gulf or GAES.
The currently available EASA material does not establish that MRO Gulf inherited approval EASA.145.0650, that the certificate was transferred after the ownership change, or that a new application was approved. Nor does it show that GAES and the former Volga-Dnepr Gulf operation are the same legal entity.
That distinction is central to the regulatory question. A change of trading name or ownership does not automatically transfer an aviation approval. EASA would ordinarily need to assess the legal entity, management structure, facilities, personnel, procedures and scope of work covered by the certificate.
European approval is not evidence of sanctions circumvention. The relevant issue is whether an approved or applicant organisation has serviced aircraft owned or controlled by sanctioned parties, supplied prohibited technical assistance, or supported transactions intended to bypass EU restrictions.
EASA’s guidance on restrictive measures against Russia explains that the agency suspended certificates issued to organisations in Russia after the EU imposed sanctions following the full-scale invasion of Ukraine. It also addresses the effect of sanctions on certificates, approvals, technical services and exchanges with Russian aviation entities.
EASA has stated that a maintenance provider must determine whether an aircraft is owned or controlled by an individual or entity subject to an EU asset freeze. Where sanctioned ownership or control is established, maintenance services should not be provided because doing so could make economic resources available to the designated party.
The agency’s more detailed guidance on aircraft maintenance and continuing airworthiness also addresses work performed for third-country operators. It states that maintenance may not be used to circumvent Regulation (EU) No 833/2014, even where the immediate customer is neither Russian nor based in the EU.
That is directly relevant to aircraft moving through intermediary owners. A maintenance organisation may receive an aircraft registered in Gambia, the UAE or another third country, while its eventual operator or intended destination remains less visible.
The compliance question is therefore not confined to the registration displayed on the aircraft. It includes beneficial ownership, operational control, contractual counterparties, the declared end-user and whether the maintenance provider knew, or had reason to know, that its work would support a prohibited Russian aviation activity.
EASA’s notice to aviation stakeholders states that EU restrictive measures apply to applicants and certificate holders as well as to the agency’s own regulatory actions. The notice forms part of the framework under which approvals may be suspended, limited or refused where sanctions apply.
The historical record therefore establishes that Volga-Dnepr Gulf’s Sharjah operation previously held EASA Part-145 approval. It does not establish the present regulatory status of MRO Gulf, whether a new application was made after the rebranding, or whether any successor company is currently authorised under the same certificate.
Those questions require confirmation from EASA of the present status of approval EASA.145.0650, the identity of the current certificate holder, the approved scope of work and any applications submitted after the 2022 change in name, management or ownership.
A system built to fragment responsibility
The cases differ in detail, but the structure is consistent.
A Boeing previously operated by a Ukrainian airline is returned to its lessor, transferred through the Gambian register and delivered to Belavia.
An Airbus previously flown by Etihad Airways and Air Albania passes through Istanbul and Muscat before appearing at Moscow’s Vnukovo Airport as RA-73899.
Former Saudia Boeing 777s become associated with a UAE intermediary, acquire Gambian registrations and are subsequently reported in connection with Iran’s Mahan Air.
The same pattern extends from complete aircraft to the parts required to keep them flying. In December 2023, the US Treasury sanctioned Dubai-based A T S Heavy Equipment and Machinery Spare Parts Trading, stating that it had delivered millions of dollars’ worth of aircraft parts to Russia. The company was designated for operating in the aerospace sector of the Russian economy.
In April 2026, Washington sanctioned another Dubai company, Chabok FZCO, alleging that it had procured US-origin sensors and other aircraft components for Mahan Air. In the same action, the Treasury identified two Boeing 777s, EP-MTE and EP-MTB, as aircraft owned and operated by the sanctioned Iranian carrier.
Earlier US actions had already identified UAE-based companies accused of supplying Mahan Air with American-origin aviation parts through freight-forwarding and intermediary arrangements. Those cases show that Gulf trading companies have repeatedly been used to obtain components that Iranian operators could not purchase directly.
A separate network identified by Washington links Mohamad Hasan Wehbe to Lebanon-based Seven Seas SAL Offshore and Seven Seas Group S.A.R.L. The US Treasury said the companies were used by Alaa Hassan Hamieh for procurement and money laundering. Public business profiles have separately associated Wehbe with Lebanon Sky Aviation SAL, although the corporate link between that company and the UAE entity involved in the proposed Atitech maintenance agreement remains unresolved.
The companies and individuals named in reporting have challenged publications, while journalists have attempted to reconstruct transactions through aircraft registrations, flight movements, contracts, invoices, freight documents, company correspondence and confidential testimony.
No single fact establishes that every transaction was controlled by one organisation. A unified command structure is not required.
The system works because responsibility is divided.
One company owns an aircraft. Another leases it. A broker markets it. An asset manager places it into storage. A maintenance provider prepares it for return to service. A third country issues a temporary registration. A separate trader supplies sensors, engines or replacement components. The eventual operator becomes visible only at the end of the chain.
Each participant can describe its role as limited and commercially routine. A former operator can say that the aircraft had already been sold or returned to its lessor. A maintenance company can say that it dealt only with the customer named in its contract. A registry can say that it processed a valid application. A supplier can say that it sold to an intermediary outside the sanctioned jurisdiction.
Viewed separately, those explanations may be accurate.
Viewed together, the result is that Western-built aircraft and components continue to reach operators in Russia, Belarus and Iran despite extensive sanctions, export controls and restrictions on technical support.
Investigations into Russian aviation parts have already shown how products originating with Western manufacturers can travel through third-country companies before reaching Russian airlines. Customs-data analysis has identified intermediary businesses as a central feature of these supply chains.
The enforcement problem is therefore not limited to direct sales. It concerns the entire transaction: beneficial ownership, financing, brokering, maintenance, temporary registration, freight handling, end-user declarations and the knowledge of each participant.
The fragmented structure gives every intermediary a degree of distance from the final destination. It also makes accountability dependent on documents that are rarely available in one jurisdiction: contracts in the UAE, registration records in Gambia, maintenance files in Oman or Sharjah, payment records in another financial centre and the final aircraft registration in Russia, Belarus or Iran.
That fragmentation is not incidental. It is what allows the system to function.
The enforcement question for Europe
The issue for European governments is no longer whether aviation sanctions can be circumvented. US designations and customs investigations have already shown that aircraft components reached Russian and Iranian operators through companies in the United Arab Emirates, India and other intermediary jurisdictions.
A customs-data investigation into Boeing and Airbus supply chains traced hundreds of shipments from Western manufacturers and distributors through Indian companies to Russian buyers after direct exports had been prohibited. Several of the intermediaries identified in that reporting were later sanctioned by the United States.
The European Union already prohibits the export, sale, supply or transfer of aircraft, aircraft parts and aviation equipment to Russia. Its transport sanctions also cover third-country carriers supplying aviation goods to Russian airlines.
The remaining question is whether regulators can identify complete aircraft transactions before a jet reaches its final operator.
That requires access to beneficial-ownership records, sale and lease agreements, escrow payments, insurance documents, ferry-flight authorisations, maintenance certificates, export declarations and national aircraft-registration files.
The European Commission should explain how it is responding to the companies raised in the MEPs’ written question and whether information has been sought from the UAE, Oman, Gambia and other jurisdictions appearing repeatedly in these transactions.
The EU already possesses an anti-circumvention mechanism allowing it, as a last resort, to restrict exports of specified sanctioned goods to third countries where there is a persistent and particularly high risk of diversion to Russia. The measure was introduced as part of the EU’s 11th sanctions package, alongside greater emphasis on cooperation with third-country authorities and action against individual intermediaries.
Gambia’s aircraft register warrants particular attention. Temporary registration is lawful and is commonly used for storage, ferry flights, leasing and ownership changes. Repeated use of C5 marks during aircraft transfers towards Belarus and Iran, however, requires an account of the due diligence undertaken, the beneficial owners declared and the destinations provided in each application.
The same scrutiny should extend to Gulf aviation centres. Sharjah, Dubai, Fujairah and Muscat are legitimate hubs for aircraft trading, storage, maintenance and finance. Their infrastructure can also provide the technical preparation, registration support and neutral-looking ferry routes needed to place distance between an aircraft’s previous operator and a final destination subject to sanctions.
European maintenance rules already recognise the danger created by intermediary customers. EASA guidance on maintenance and continuing airworthiness states that work for a non-EU, non-Russian operator must not be used to circumvent restrictions where the aircraft or components are ultimately intended for Russian operation.
EASA has also made clear that maintenance intended to retain or improve the airworthiness or commercial value of sanctioned aircraft for use in Russia is prohibited, even where limited measures needed for safe storage may remain permissible.
The enforcement task therefore reaches beyond the nationality painted on an aircraft or the immediate customer named in a contract. Regulators must examine who controls the aircraft, who financed the transaction, where it will operate and whether the intermediary structure reflects the true end-user.
The aircraft themselves are visible. Their histories can often be reconstructed through serial numbers, registration changes and flight movements.
What remains hidden are the contracts, payments, mandates and beneficial owners controlling the decisive stage of each transfer.
That is where the shadow fleet operates — not in the sky, but in the gaps between one owner, one register and the next.
