Slovakia’s prime minister Robert Fico has said his government wants to “normalise” relations with Russia and will expand imports of Russian gas, in a move that places Bratislava at odds with wider European Union energy policy.
Speaking during a meeting with Vladimir Putin in Beijing on Tuesday, held on the sidelines of China’s commemorations of the end of the Second World War, Mr Fico expressed gratitude for Moscow’s continued gas deliveries via the TurkStream pipeline. He also indicated Slovakia would consider Russian companies for participation in a future nuclear power plant project.
“I want to say openly that we are extremely interested in standardisation of relations between the Slovak Republic and the Russian Federation,” Mr Fico told the Russian president. “Let’s get back to what used to be typical for countries when it comes to economic cooperation.”
His remarks underline the increasingly divergent approach of Slovakia and Hungary from the EU’s collective stance towards Moscow. Brussels has committed to phasing out all Russian energy imports by the end of 2027, part of a broader effort to reduce the bloc’s dependence on Russian hydrocarbons following the invasion of Ukraine in 2022.
TurkStream and energy dependence
TurkStream, running under the Black Sea from Russia to Turkey, has become Moscow’s last remaining direct export route for pipeline gas into Europe. Supplies through Nord Stream 1 ceased after explosions damaged the twin pipelines in September 2022, while Russian exports through Ukraine ended in January this year.
According to data from Slovak transit company EUstream, Slovakia has already imported about 1.7 billion cubic metres of gas this year via Hungary, which is directly linked to TurkStream. Capacity at the Hungarian–Slovak border is being expanded from 3.5 billion cubic metres per year to 4.4 billion cubic metres, a project designed to allow greater volumes of Russian gas to flow into Slovakia.
“I want to thank you for the safe and regular gas supplies that we receive through TurkStream,” Mr Fico told Mr Putin during their meeting.
Slovakia and neighbouring Hungary have argued that replacing Russian gas with alternative sources would significantly raise energy costs for consumers and industry. Both governments have resisted EU proposals to accelerate the transition to other suppliers, maintaining that affordable and stable energy flows remain their priority.
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Nuclear energy and visas
Mr Fico also signalled that Russian firms could play a role in the construction of a new Slovak nuclear power plant, a project that the government has previously indicated could be awarded to the US company Westinghouse. The statement suggests Bratislava may be seeking to balance offers from competing bidders, including Russia’s Rosatom, despite the EU’s reservations about reliance on Russian technology.
The Slovak leader confirmed that his government had resumed issuing visas to Russian citizens, reversing a suspension introduced after the start of the war in Ukraine. The move is likely to be viewed in Brussels as another step away from coordinated EU sanctions and restrictions.
Regional diplomacy
Mr Fico said he would meet Ukraine’s president Volodymyr Zelenskyy on Friday in Uzhhorod, a city in western Ukraine near the Slovak border. The meeting, initially planned for eastern Slovakia, is expected to address regional energy security and recent disruptions to the Druzhba oil pipeline.
The Druzhba line, which carries Russian crude to Slovakia and Hungary, was temporarily shut down following Ukrainian strikes on Russian infrastructure in recent weeks. Bratislava has raised concerns about the vulnerability of its energy supplies to developments in the conflict.
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Slovakia, which joined the EU in 2004 and the eurozone in 2009, has long relied on Russian energy, though recent governments had attempted to diversify imports. Mr Fico, a populist leader serving his fourth term as prime minister, has taken a different direction, emphasising cost and stability over alignment with Brussels’ long-term decarbonisation strategy.
European reaction
The European Commission has consistently urged member states to end their reliance on Russian energy, arguing that continued purchases undermine sanctions imposed on Moscow and provide critical revenue for the Kremlin. While countries such as Germany and Poland have sharply reduced imports since 2022, Hungary and Slovakia remain among the most dependent.
Slovakia’s move to deepen energy ties with Russia may complicate EU efforts to present a united front. Officials in Brussels are expected to reiterate the target of eliminating Russian energy from the bloc’s mix by 2027, but enforcement will depend on the cooperation of all member states.
Outlook
Mr Fico’s remarks in Beijing make clear that his government is prioritising economic cooperation with Russia over solidarity with Ukraine, despite Moscow’s continuing war of aggression. By presenting Russian gas as a “pragmatic necessity”, Bratislava is not only disregarding the EU’s agreed timetable to phase out Russian supplies but is also helping sustain the Kremlin’s energy revenues, which finance its war effort.
The meeting with President Putin illustrates how Russia continues to exploit divisions within the European Union by cultivating leaders willing to break ranks. Slovakia, alongside Hungary, provides Moscow with diplomatic openings and economic lifelines, undermining Brussels’ strategy of isolating the Kremlin. Such bilateral gestures directly weaken European unity at a time when cohesion is critical to countering Russian aggression.
Mr Fico’s planned meeting with President Zelenskyy in Uzhhorod will do little to mask the contradiction in Slovakia’s position: claiming to support Ukraine while simultaneously reinforcing its dependence on Russian energy. Together with Hungary, Bratislava has placed national energy concerns and political calculations above collective European policy, in effect subsidising Moscow’s war machine. This divergence highlights the EU’s internal vulnerabilities and raises questions about the credibility of its sanctions regime when member states openly flout agreed objectives.
