The United States has tightened export controls on companies in third countries accused of supplying Russia, marking Washington’s first major Commerce Department action on Russia since President Donald Trump took office.
On 12 September, the Bureau of Industry and Security (BIS) added 32 companies to its Entity List, restricting their access to US goods and technology. The designations span China (23), Turkey (3), the United Arab Emirates (2), and one each in India, Iran, Singapore and Taiwan; several entries carry “Russian procurement” footnotes that extend controls to certain foreign-made items tied to US technology.
The move underscores a shift towards pressuring Russia’s supply networks outside its borders. BIS cited diversion of US-origin items to Russia, concealment of shipments, and support to Russian military end users among the reasons for listing. One India-based trader was listed for allegedly diverting items to Russia, while Turkish companies were cited for handling components identified in Russian weapons and for evading end-use checks. An affiliated Fudan Microelectronics entity was listed in Singapore and Taiwan, reflecting US concerns over trans-shipment risks. The rule took effect on 12 September.
In parallel, the US is pressing partners to tighten broader economic pressure. The Treasury Department has urged G7 and EU governments to apply steep “secondary” tariffs on countries purchasing Russian oil—specifically China and India—arguing such measures would curtail Moscow’s wartime revenues. President Trump has already doubled duties on Indian imports to 50%, with Washington signalling further coordination with allies. European capitals are cautious about across-the-board tariffs but are discussing more targeted actions.
For the European Union, the US step aligns with a trend towards targeting enablers beyond Russia. Brussels is weighing the inclusion of independent Chinese refineries in its 19th sanctions package and recently prolonged listings on thousands of Russia-related individuals and entities. EU measures have already hit India’s Nayara Energy—majority owned by Russian interests—contributing to operational cuts and complicating crude and product logistics, according to industry reporting.
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Whether these measures deliver sustained impact will depend on enforcement. Some governments in Asia and the Middle East continue to buy Russian energy, often at discounts. Indian refiners have adjusted purchases as discounts narrow and compliance costs rise, while EU and US authorities increase scrutiny of shipping and financing. BIS’s latest listings explicitly aim to close known evasion channels by extending controls to foreign-made items linked to US technology and by naming entities tied to battlefield-recovered components.
The timing of Washington’s action coincides with heightened security tensions in Europe. NATO has launched “Eastern Sentry” after a mass Russian drone incursion into Polish airspace—the most serious violation of Alliance territory since 2022—prompting air defence responses and allied deployments along the eastern flank. Polish and NATO officials condemned the incident; Moscow said any drone overflight was unintentional. The US response has been more guarded, though Polish ministers have urged allied solidarity.
Diplomatic calendars may further test sanctions leverage. Malaysia’s prime minister has said Mr Trump will visit Kuala Lumpur for ASEAN-related meetings in late October and that Mr Putin is “considering” a trip, raising the prospect of high-level encounters in Asia. Neither capital has confirmed any bilateral agenda.
For Washington and Brussels, the policy trajectory is clearer: constrain Russia’s war economy by targeting procurement networks and oil revenues while coordinating with partners on enforcement. BIS’s additions increase licensing hurdles for named firms and their counterparties; entities with “Russian procurement” footnotes face extra-territorial controls on certain foreign-produced items incorporating US technology. The EU, for its part, is moving towards designations of non-Russian actors seen as enabling sanctions evasion, including in energy and logistics.
The practical test is execution. Previous rounds of sanctions and controls have forced adaptations in Russian supply chains rather than immediate cessation. However, the combination of entity listings, shipping and insurance restrictions, and potential tariff measures raises costs and complicates access to components and finance. The impact on refineries and traders linked to Russian crude illustrates how targeted listings can ripple through supply networks beyond Russia’s borders. Continued coordination among the US, EU and G7—together with sustained scrutiny of trans-shipment hubs—will determine how far the latest steps constrain Moscow’s ability to source critical goods and monetise energy exports.
