The German Chancellor’s proposal has caused concern in Kyiv, but its practical value may lie in giving Ukraine earlier influence, institutional access and security integration while full EU membership remains subject to lengthy negotiations.
Friedrich Merz’s proposal for a new framework to bring Ukraine closer to the European Union has been met with caution in Kyiv. That reaction is understandable. Any formula that appears to fall short of full EU membership risks being interpreted as a political substitute for accession rather than a step towards it.
Yet the proposal deserves closer examination. If properly framed, and if clearly linked to full membership, it could give Ukraine several advantages that previous candidate countries did not enjoy at this stage of their European path.
The central issue is not the label. The term “associated membership” is politically difficult for Ukraine, because it suggests a secondary status. Kyiv has repeatedly made clear that it is seeking full EU membership, not a permanent halfway arrangement. For that reason, the wording may need to change. But the substance of the proposal is more important than the terminology attached to it.
The first potential advantage is speed. Ukraine’s formal accession negotiations began in 2024, but the process remains vulnerable to technical delay, political blockage and unanimity requirements among member states. Even where there is broad support for Ukraine, enlargement decisions can be slowed by domestic politics inside the EU. Hungary’s repeated use of obstruction has already shown how one member state can delay progress.
Merz’s proposal seeks to reduce the gap between political commitment and practical integration. One of its main elements is the immediate opening of all negotiating chapters or clusters. For Ukraine, this would help move the accession process from symbolic endorsement into structured, measurable work across the full range of EU legislation and standards.
The second advantage is institutional presence. The proposal would allow Ukrainian representatives to take part in meetings of EU institutions, including the European Council, the Council of the EU, the European Commission and the European Parliament. They would not have voting rights, but this should not be dismissed as meaningless.
In Brussels, influence is often exercised before a formal vote takes place. Decisions are shaped in preparatory meetings, committee discussions, working groups, political families and informal exchanges between capitals. A country that is present in the room can explain its interests, identify risks, build alliances and correct misunderstandings before positions harden.
For Ukraine, this could be especially important. Many EU decisions already affect Ukraine directly, including sanctions, defence funding, trade, energy, reconstruction, agriculture, transport, border management and industrial policy. Institutional presence would allow Kyiv to participate in debates that already concern its future, instead of reacting after decisions have been made.
The absence of voting rights is a legal limitation, not simply a political choice. Full voting rights inside EU institutions are tied to membership under the EU treaties. Giving Ukraine a vote before accession would require a treaty-level solution and would almost certainly be impossible in the short term. But participation without a vote could still mark a major shift if introduced early in the accession process.
The third advantage is gradual legal integration. The proposal envisages the phased application of parts of the EU acquis as Ukraine advances through negotiations. This could help Ukraine align with EU law not only as an administrative requirement, but as a practical process of integration into the single market and regulatory system.
For businesses, investors and public institutions, gradual alignment could provide more predictability. It would also make the accession process less abstract. Instead of waiting for a single final moment of entry, Ukraine would begin to function more like an EU member state in selected areas before accession is complete.
The fourth advantage concerns EU programmes. The proposal would not immediately open the most sensitive parts of the EU budget, including agricultural subsidies and cohesion funding. Those areas are politically difficult because Ukraine’s size, agricultural capacity and reconstruction needs would have major budgetary implications for existing member states.
However, access to Commission-managed programmes could still be useful. It could help Ukrainian institutions, universities, municipalities, companies and civil society organisations participate more fully in European networks. This matters not only for funding, but for administrative adaptation. Countries do not join the EU only by changing laws; they join by learning how to operate inside EU systems.
The fifth advantage is security integration. The proposal includes deeper Ukrainian participation in EU foreign and security policy, including possible relevance to Article 42.7 of the Treaty on European Union, the EU’s mutual assistance clause. This would not replace NATO membership, nor would it give Ukraine the same guarantee as NATO’s Article 5. But it could connect Ukraine more closely to EU defence planning, military mobility and security policy at a time when Europe is reassessing its own defence responsibilities.
For Ukraine, this could have direct practical value. Faster military mobility, deeper defence-industrial cooperation and stronger alignment with EU security mechanisms would support Ukraine’s war effort and its long-term defence planning. It would also recognise that Ukraine is already central to European security, even before it becomes an EU member state.
The sixth advantage is political credibility. A “snap-back” mechanism, allowing the EU to reduce benefits if reforms are reversed, may be uncomfortable for Kyiv. But it could also make the proposal more acceptable to sceptical member states. If the mechanism reassures governments concerned about rule of law, corruption and institutional resilience, it may help unlock earlier benefits that would otherwise be withheld.
Ukraine should not treat conditionality as a concession to its critics. It is already part of the accession process. The question is whether conditionality is used to block progress indefinitely or to structure progress in a way that produces tangible gains. A framework that links benefits to reforms could strengthen reformist forces inside Ukraine by showing that difficult decisions bring visible European integration.
The political risk is clear. Any interim arrangement must not become a waiting room without an exit. Ukraine would be right to reject any model that freezes its status below full membership or allows hesitant EU governments to avoid the final accession decision. The proposal would therefore need firm safeguards: it must state clearly that Ukraine’s objective remains full membership, that interim participation is not a substitute for accession, and that progress under the framework should accelerate rather than delay the final treaty.
There is also a Moldova question. Ukraine and Moldova have advanced together in the accession process, and separating them could create unnecessary political complications. A credible version of the Merz proposal would need to consider how Moldova fits into the same framework, as well as how similar demands from Western Balkan candidates would be handled.
Even with these risks, the proposal reflects an important reality. Ukraine cannot afford an accession process that exists only on paper for years. Nor can the EU credibly say that Ukraine belongs in Europe while keeping it outside the rooms where decisions affecting its future are made.
The best approach for Kyiv may therefore be neither to reject the German idea outright nor to accept it unconditionally. Ukraine should seek to reshape it. The language should avoid any suggestion of second-tier membership. The legal framework should preserve full accession as the final objective. The institutional access should be meaningful, not ceremonial. The benefits should be linked to reform progress, but not made vulnerable to arbitrary political obstruction.
If those conditions are met, Merz’s proposal could serve Ukraine’s interests. It could give Kyiv earlier influence in Brussels, accelerate legal and administrative alignment, strengthen security cooperation and make accession more practical before the formal act of membership is possible.
For Ukraine, the issue is not whether the proposal is perfect. It is whether it can be turned into a mechanism that brings the country closer to the EU in substance, not only in rhetoric. On that test, the German initiative may be worth serious negotiation rather than immediate dismissal.
