Manfred Weber’s call for a tougher European Union trade policy towards China has added political pressure to a debate that is already moving from industrial concern to economic security.
The leader of the European People’s Party in the European Parliament urged Brussels to take a more assertive stance towards Beijing, warning that China’s industrial strength posed a direct threat to parts of Europe’s economy. His intervention, made ahead of the European Council meeting on 18 June, comes as protective trade measures and the EU’s wider economic-security position are expected to form part of the discussion among EU leaders.
Weber’s argument reflects a shift inside the EU’s political centre-right. China is no longer being treated only as a commercial competitor or export market, but as a structural challenge to Europe’s industrial base, technological autonomy and control over strategic infrastructure.
In remarks reported from an interview with Bild am Sonntag, Weber said the EU’s trade deficit with China, which he put at almost €1 billion a day, was no longer sustainable. He also called for Chinese companies to be excluded from EU-funded development projects overseas and from Europe’s development of 6G technology.
The proposal is politically important because it extends the debate beyond tariffs. It links trade policy, public procurement, development spending and next-generation digital infrastructure. In effect, Weber is arguing that access to EU money, EU markets and EU technology programmes should be used as leverage against unfair competition and strategic dependence.
The scale of the imbalance is already visible in the EU’s own trade figures. According to the Commission’s China trade profile, the EU recorded a goods deficit with China of €359.9 billion in 2025, higher than in 2024, though still below the 2022 record. Council data show that in 2024 the EU exported goods worth €213.2 billion to China and imported €519 billion.
That imbalance is now being read through a different political lens. For years, the dominant EU calculation was that deep trade with China could be managed through market access, investment and regulatory dialogue. That view has weakened as Chinese overcapacity, export controls, subsidies and the security risks attached to critical technologies have moved up the Brussels agenda.
The issue has become especially sensitive in sectors where Europe is trying to rebuild or defend industrial capacity. Electric vehicles, batteries, solar components, steel, critical raw materials, telecoms equipment and high-tech manufacturing have all become part of the same wider argument: whether Europe can maintain an open market while preventing state-backed competitors from eroding its own productive base.
The Commission has already been considering new supply-chain rules aimed at reducing dependence on single suppliers in sensitive sectors. One proposal under discussion would require companies in critical areas to broaden their supply chains, including away from China where concentration creates risk. That approach would mark a further move from traditional free-trade policy towards managed economic security.
Weber’s reference to 6G is also significant. The EU’s Smart Networks and Services Joint Undertaking was created to support European industrial leadership in 5G and 6G. The next generation of telecoms networks will be central to industrial automation, defence communications, connected transport, public services and data infrastructure. Excluding Chinese participation from that space would therefore be more than a symbolic trade measure. It would be a statement about who is trusted to help build Europe’s future digital backbone.
The political difficulty is that EU member states do not all see China in the same way. France has generally pushed for a more interventionist trade-defence approach. Germany, whose industry remains heavily exposed to China, has traditionally been more cautious, although its position has hardened as pressure on manufacturing has increased. Smaller member states may also worry about retaliation, market access, investment flows or the cost of replacing Chinese suppliers.
That division matters because the EU’s trade tools are only effective when backed by political unity. Beijing has often been able to work around European pressure by exploiting differences between member states. A harder line from the EPP leadership may therefore strengthen the Commission’s hand, but it does not remove the challenge of building agreement among capitals.
There is also a risk of escalation. If Brussels restricts Chinese companies from EU-funded projects or future telecoms infrastructure, Beijing could respond through procurement, regulatory pressure, export controls or informal barriers against European firms. The EU’s trade policy is therefore moving into a more contested space, where market access, industrial policy and geopolitical leverage are increasingly connected.
For European businesses, the debate is no longer theoretical. The question is whether Brussels can protect strategic industries without raising costs, fragmenting supply chains or provoking retaliation that hits exporters. For policymakers, the question is whether the EU can still defend an open trading system while responding to an economy as large, subsidised and strategically directed as China’s.
Weber’s intervention does not settle those questions. It does, however, show that the political centre of gravity in Brussels is moving. The June summit will test whether EU leaders are prepared to turn China policy from warnings and sectoral measures into a more coherent trade-defence strategy.
