Armenia’s hosting of the European Political Community summit, and the presence of Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Yerevan, underlined a broader shift in a region long regarded by Moscow as part of its strategic sphere.
The European Political Community summit in Yerevan has become a marker of changing power balances in the South Caucasus. The meeting, held in the Armenian capital on 4 May, brought European leaders to a country still formally linked to Russian-led structures, but increasingly seeking closer relations with the European Union. The European Council described the summit as the first such gathering of the European Political Community in the South Caucasus, placing Armenia at the centre of a wider European diplomatic forum.
For Moscow, the setting was politically sensitive. Armenia remains a member of the Eurasian Economic Union and has not formally withdrawn from the Collective Security Treaty Organisation, although its participation in the Russian-led security bloc has been frozen. Yet Yerevan hosted a European summit attended by more than 40 leaders, while Ukrainian President Volodymyr Zelenskyy was received by Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan during what Kyiv said was the first visit by a Ukrainian head of state to Armenia in 24 years.
Russia’s reaction was sharp. On 7 May, the Russian Foreign Ministry summoned Armenia’s ambassador in Moscow after Zelenskyy’s remarks during his visit. Moscow accused Armenia of providing a platform for what it described as “terrorist threats” against Russia, and said it was unacceptable for such statements to be made during an EU-sponsored event in Yerevan. Reuters reported that the protest centred on comments linked to Russia’s Victory Day commemorations and concerns over possible drone threats.
The protest illustrated Russia’s discomfort with Armenia’s shifting diplomatic posture. A routine European gathering in Yerevan might once have been treated by Moscow as an irritant. Instead, the Kremlin’s response suggested that it viewed both the summit itself and Zelenskyy’s presence as a challenge to its assumed authority in a region it has long considered within its sphere of influence.
Armenia’s repositioning did not begin with the Yerevan summit. Relations between Yerevan and Moscow deteriorated after Azerbaijan regained control of Karabakh in 2023, despite the presence of Russian peacekeepers. Pashinyan’s government has since moved to diversify Armenia’s foreign policy, deepening ties with Europe while avoiding a formal rupture with Moscow. Armenia’s accession to the International Criminal Court and its suspension of participation in the CSTO were part of that wider pattern. Associated Press noted that the latest EU-Armenia summit followed this longer process of distancing from Russia.
The EU dimension was reinforced immediately after the European Political Community meeting. On 5 May, Armenia hosted its first bilateral summit with the European Union. The EU-Armenia summit declaration referred to expected EU investments in Armenia reaching €2.5 billion under the Global Gateway strategy, with a focus on transport, energy and digital connectivity. The European Council also highlighted a new EU-Armenia Connectivity Partnership as part of the same process.
This does not mean that Armenia has fully broken with Russia. Moscow retains economic, political and security instruments in the country, including a military presence at Gyumri. Armenian policy remains constrained by geography, trade dependence and unresolved regional security risks. But the trend is towards diversification, and the Yerevan meetings gave that trend a formal European setting.
The wider regional context is also important. Zelenskyy’s recent visit to Azerbaijan, where he met President Ilham Aliyev in Gabala on 25 April, showed that Ukraine is maintaining active relations across the South Caucasus despite the war. The Azerbaijani presidency said the talks covered bilateral co-operation, security and humanitarian issues, including assistance to Ukraine.
Ukraine and Azerbaijan deepen security ties as Zelenskyy visits Gabala
Georgia presents a more complicated picture. Its present political course has strained relations with Brussels and Kyiv, and its EU and NATO paths remain effectively stalled. Yet Georgia still has no diplomatic relations with Russia, remains formally an EU candidate country, and has not withdrawn its NATO aspirations. Any Russian recovery of influence there is therefore partial and contested.
Taken together, Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia no longer fit easily into Moscow’s former regional model. Each has its own priorities, constraints and political calculations. None can be described as fully aligned with the West. But none is now simply operating inside a Russian-dominated framework.
The Yerevan summit mattered because it demonstrated that European diplomacy can operate openly in a capital once seen as one of Moscow’s closest regional partners. Zelenskyy’s presence added a further political signal: Ukraine, while fighting Russia’s full-scale invasion, is able to maintain diplomatic reach in a region where Moscow’s authority is no longer assumed.
Russia’s anger over the summit was therefore not only about individual remarks by the Ukrainian president. It reflected a broader strategic problem for Moscow. The South Caucasus remains contested, but Russia’s ability to define the region’s political limits is diminishing.
