President Karol Nawrocki’s call for a new Polish constitution has turned a long-running institutional dispute with Donald Tusk’s government into a central political question. The proposal is unlikely to advance without a future constitutional majority, but it could shape Poland’s next parliamentary and presidential campaigns.
Poland’s political confrontation has entered a new phase after President Karol Nawrocki launched a process aimed at preparing a new constitution by 2030. The initiative was announced on May 3, as Poland marked the 235th anniversary of the Constitution of 1791, and involves the creation of a council tasked with drafting proposals for what Nawrocki has called a “new generation” basic law, according to Notes from Poland.
Nawrocki argues that the constitution adopted in 1997 no longer reflects Poland’s political realities. In his view, the existing division of powers has contributed to repeated institutional crises, particularly when the president and the government represent opposing political camps. He has said that he respects the current constitution and its authors, but that Poland now needs a constitutional settlement fit for the next decade.
The proposal has a clear political dimension. Nawrocki’s first term is due to end in 2030. A new constitution prepared within that timeframe could become part of his case for a second term, potentially under a system in which the presidency holds greater power than it does today.
Poland’s current constitution gives the president limited but important powers. These include the right to veto legislation, influence senior appointments, take part in foreign policy, and affect the functioning of the judiciary. When the president and government are political allies, these powers do not usually produce sustained confrontation. When they come from rival camps, the system can produce paralysis.
That has been the case since Donald Tusk returned to office in December 2023. His government has faced a presidency opposed to much of its programme, first under Andrzej Duda and then under Nawrocki, who won the 2025 presidential election. The dispute has affected judicial reform, ambassadorial appointments, foreign policy and legislation. In February, Nawrocki vetoed a judicial reform bill, deepening the conflict between the presidency and Tusk’s government.
One of the most sensitive areas is the Constitutional Tribunal. Nawrocki has refused to accept the oaths of several newly appointed judges, prompting the governing coalition to escalate the dispute by arranging for the oath to be taken in the Sejm. The episode underlined the extent to which Poland’s constitutional framework is now being tested by prolonged cohabitation between hostile political camps.
The newly created council includes figures from constitutional law, conservative politics and previous institutional disputes. Its composition includes former Sejm marshal Józef Zych, Professor Ryszard Piotrowski, former Law and Justice MEP Ryszard Legutko, Barbara Piwnik, Anna Łabno, Marek Jurek and Julia Przyłębska, the former head of the Constitutional Tribunal. Przyłębska’s inclusion is likely to attract particular scrutiny because her period at the Tribunal is associated with the contested judicial changes introduced during Law and Justice rule.
Tusk has dismissed the initiative, arguing that Nawrocki should begin by observing the constitution currently in force. The prime minister has also said that there is no present majority capable of adopting the president’s proposals. That assessment reflects the legal reality. Under Article 235 of Poland’s constitution, constitutional amendments require a two-thirds majority in the Sejm, with at least half of deputies present, and an absolute majority in the Senate.
No existing political camp has such numbers. A new constitution would therefore require either a broad cross-party agreement or a major change in parliamentary arithmetic after the 2027 election. At present, a compromise between Tusk’s coalition and Law and Justice appears unlikely.
Even so, Nawrocki’s initiative may have wider consequences. By placing constitutional change at the centre of political debate, he has moved the issue from the margins into the mainstream. The argument that Poland’s institutional crisis can only be resolved through constitutional reform is now likely to feature prominently in the next election cycle.
The outcome, however, may not be the one Nawrocki intends. A debate opened in the name of strengthening the presidency could also produce demands to weaken it. Opponents of the president may argue that Poland should move closer to a parliamentary model, reducing the head of state’s ability to obstruct a government with a Sejm majority.
That calculation could also appeal to some within Law and Justice if relations between the party and Nawrocki deteriorate. A powerful presidency is attractive when occupied by an ally, but less so if it becomes an autonomous centre of political authority.
For now, the new constitution remains a political project rather than a legislative prospect. Its immediate importance lies in the way it reframes Poland’s domestic conflict. The struggle is no longer only about individual vetoes, appointments or court decisions. It is now about the structure of the state itself.
