Donald Trump’s office characterised his phone call with Vladimir Putin as “productive” and indicated that a face-to-face meeting is under consideration.
The development intersects with Kyiv’s recent outreach in Washington and with debate over possible US military assistance, including long-range cruise missiles. It also raises questions about whether pressure or restraint is judged the more effective route to a ceasefire acceptable to Western capitals and to Ukraine.
The immediate reading is tactical. Discussion of Tomahawk cruise missiles has served as negotiating leverage rather than a near-term battlefield remedy: integration, training and logistics would take months. For the moment, the signalling effect dominates. If Moscow resists a ceasefire or interim arrangement, Washington can raise costs; if Moscow entertains one, Washington can pause. Reporting from Moscow after the call underscored this dynamic: Kremlin aide Yuri Ushakov warned that supplying Tomahawks to Ukraine would damage US–Russia relations and hinder “peace prospects”, while also asserting that Russian forces hold the “strategic initiative” along the front.
Two paths are visible ahead of a proposed meeting in Budapest. One is a harder line: additional military support for Kyiv, movement on measures such as the use of frozen Russian assets, and a public posture intended to convince Moscow that delay carries material risk. The other is a holding pattern: no sudden steps that, in Mr Trump’s view, might unsettle the Kremlin or close a channel. Which path is chosen may hinge on his assessment after talks with President Volodymyr Zelenskyy in Washington.
Expectations of immediate outcomes should be modest. Absent concrete understandings with Moscow, there is little reason for the US side to press Kyiv hard in the short term. If working-level contacts progress — the Kremlin has trailed preparatory conversations between US Secretary of State Marco Rubio and Russian Foreign Minister Sergei Lavrov — pressure on Kyiv to accept an interim arrangement could follow. The comparison often drawn is the recent Middle East track: pressure when talks stalled, followed by a transactional pause-for-deliverables compromise.
Budapest is not a neutral backdrop. Hungary’s prime minister has taken positions at odds with Kyiv on EU and NATO matters, and has publicly welcomed the prospect of hosting a US–Russia meeting. Holding talks in an EU and NATO capital would also carry symbolism for Moscow, given the International Criminal Court’s arrest warrant for Mr Putin. Legal questions would be significant; the politics of a summit often test such boundaries.
On substance, Moscow’s post-call messaging emphasised two points: the warning over Tomahawks, and the claim of strategic momentum. Neither resolves policy. The first repeats a long-standing red line; the second is contested by battlefield reporting. What matters is how the US president weighs these assertions against briefings from his advisers and from Kyiv, and how they translate into near-term steps. Meanwhile, Russia has continued large-scale strikes on Ukrainian energy infrastructure — including gas facilities in Kharkiv and Poltava regions — reinforcing Kyiv’s priority for strengthened air defences and energy protection over symbolic announcements.
For Ukraine, the near-term checklist remains consistent: air defence, ammunition and predictability of supply. Cruise missiles do not defeat ballistic threats; upgraded Patriot systems do. Recent attacks underline the need for layered defences and repair capacity. In this context, a temporary pause — if it locks in protection, replenishment and training — could be of practical value even if it falls short of Kyiv’s strategic aims. The risk is symmetrical: Russia could use any pause to regroup.
The negotiating outline that has circulated since early 2025 is familiar: cessation of hostilities roughly along current lines of control; some form of monitoring; neutrality with scope for EU (but not NATO) integration; and phased sanctions relief, potentially linked to Ukraine’s reconstruction finance. None of this is agreed. The political arithmetic remains difficult. Still, the window for testing propositions may be wider now than at any time since February 2022.
Domestic factors in the United States will intrude. Mr Trump prizes demonstrable outcomes. A claim to have halted large-scale fighting in Europe would meet that test. If Moscow shows tangible movement — for example, easing pressure on Ukraine’s energy grid — the case for restraint on new measures strengthens; if Moscow escalates, the case for pressure increases. Either way, further signals are likely to be prompt and visible.
In the short run, Budapest — if it proceeds — will be theatre; substance will be scripted beforehand. Kyiv will seek clarity on air-defence resupply and timelines; Washington will test whether calibrated pressure can move Moscow without closing channels. The task is to convert signalling into changes on the ground — or, failing that, to avoid steps that worsen them.
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