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France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Lithuania are pressing the European Commission to take a firmer line on Chinese imports, as concern grows over industrial overcapacity, trade deficits and possible retaliation from Beijing.
Several EU capitals are pressing the European Commission to adopt stronger trade-defence measures against China, in a sign that concern over Chinese industrial overcapacity is moving from specialist trade policy into the centre of European economic debate.
The push, reported by the Financial Times, involves France, Spain, Italy, the Netherlands and Lithuania, which are urging Brussels to respond more forcefully to what they regard as unfair competition from Chinese imports. Their concern is that Chinese goods are entering the European market at prices and volumes that European manufacturers cannot match, particularly where production is supported by state subsidies, low domestic demand or excess capacity.
The issue is not confined to one sector. Electric vehicles, batteries, solar panels, steel, chemicals, medical ingredients and advanced manufacturing components have all become part of the wider discussion about Europe’s exposure to Chinese industrial policy. The Commission already has a range of trade-defence instruments, including anti-dumping and anti-subsidy duties, but several member states now want Brussels to move faster and apply a broader set of tools.
The pressure reflects a shift in tone. For much of the past two years, EU trade policy has been shaped by the need to manage tensions with both Washington and Beijing. The return of a more protectionist trade agenda in the United States has forced the EU to defend its own market access, while China’s export model has created parallel pressure on European producers. Brussels is now being pushed to show that “de-risking” can mean active market defence, not only supply-chain monitoring.
China remains one of the EU’s largest trading partners, but the imbalance has become politically harder to ignore. The EU’s annual trade deficit with China has been reported at about €360 billion, a figure that has sharpened the argument among governments calling for a more assertive response. For manufacturers, the concern is not simply that imports are cheaper. It is that sustained price pressure could weaken Europe’s industrial base in sectors that are also linked to energy transition, defence resilience and strategic autonomy.
Germany’s position remains more cautious. Berlin has deep commercial links with China, particularly through the automotive, machinery and chemical sectors. German companies have long depended on Chinese demand, while also facing growing competition from Chinese producers. That leaves Germany exposed on both sides of the debate: too soft a line risks further pressure on domestic industry, while too hard a line risks retaliation against firms with large interests in China.
Beijing has already signalled that it is prepared to respond. In April, China warned that it could take countermeasures if the EU did not revise proposed industrial and technology rules, including provisions linked to procurement, cybersecurity and supplier risk. The warning underlined the risk that a European trade-defence push could develop into a wider dispute over industrial policy and market access.
The dispute has also reached the automotive sector. China’s auto industry body has opposed the EU’s proposed Industrial Accelerator Act, arguing that some provisions discriminate against foreign companies. Its criticism shows how quickly EU industrial policy is being interpreted in Beijing as a trade barrier, especially where it affects electric vehicles and battery supply chains.
For Brussels, the challenge is to distinguish between lawful market defence and measures that could be seen as protectionist. The Commission can open anti-dumping or anti-subsidy investigations where there is evidence that imports are being sold at unfair prices or benefit from subsidies that cause injury to European industry. Its own anti-dumping rules require evidence before duties can be imposed, which means that any stronger approach still has to be built around investigations, legal thresholds and WTO-compatible reasoning.
The political pressure, however, is moving faster than the legal machinery. European governments are increasingly concerned that conventional trade-defence cases may be too slow to deal with the scale of China’s production capacity. By the time an investigation is completed, affected European producers may already have lost market share, reduced investment or closed production lines.
That is why the current debate matters beyond trade specialists. It concerns the future shape of Europe’s industrial economy. If Chinese overcapacity continues to flow into the EU market, European companies may struggle to justify investment in sectors that governments simultaneously describe as strategic. If Brussels responds too aggressively, the EU could face retaliation, higher consumer costs and legal challenges from China.
The Commission therefore faces a difficult balance. It must protect European producers where there is evidence of unfair competition, but it must also avoid turning every industrial weakness into a trade case. The member-state pressure now building around China suggests that the balance is shifting. Europe’s debate is no longer only about access to the Chinese market. It is increasingly about how much of its own market the EU is prepared to defend.
