An increasing number of Russians are growing weary of the war with Ukraine and are open to a ceasefire, even if the Kremlin’s initial objectives remain unmet, reports Holod Media. This conclusion comes from sociologists involved in the “Chronicles” and ExtremeScan projects, who conducted independent research marking the second anniversary of the mobilisation announcement.
According to their data, about half of Russians are ready for a ceasefire with Ukraine and would support such a decision, while 63% of respondents would like to establish peace within a year.
This article explores the sentiments of Russians, their readiness for a new wave of mobilisation, and why Moscow and St. Petersburg support the war more strongly than Chechnya and Dagestan.
Survey Methodology
The research by the “Chronicles” project was conducted via telephone interviews from September 10 to 17. The sample size was 800 people over the age of 18. The confidence interval of the study is 95%, with a maximum measurement error of 3.45%.
The ExtremeScan group conducted 11 surveys from July 29 to September 6: one nationwide and 10 within specific regions—Moscow, St. Petersburg, Sverdlovsk Oblast, Krasnodar Krai, Belgorod Oblast, and the republics of Bashkortostan, Dagestan, Chechnya, Tuva, and Buryatia.
Each survey had a sample size of 500 people (a total of 5,500 respondents). The maximum measurement error when comparing regions is 4.38% at a 95% confidence interval.
Both studies used a stratified random sampling method, where sociologists first divided potential survey participants into subgroups (e.g., by gender or age) and then randomly selected specific respondents.
A Growing Fatigue and Desire for Peace
Data from the ExtremeScan and “Chronicles” surveys indicate that the number of Russians supporting a ceasefire with Ukraine has reached an all-time high—49% of respondents expressed readiness to support a peace agreement, even if the goals of the “special operation” remain unachieved. Opposing such a decision are 33% of respondents, while 18% are undecided.
If Vladimir Putin decides to withdraw Russian troops from Ukraine and begins negotiations for a ceasefire without achieving the initial objectives of the military operation, will you support or not support this decision?
| Support | Do Not Support | Undecided | |
|---|---|---|---|
| February 2023 | 40% | 47% | 13% |
| June 2023 | 39% | 39% | 22% |
| October 2023 | 40% | 33% | 27% |
| January 2024 | 40% | 39% | 21% |
| September 2024 | 49% | 33% | 18% |
Source: “Chronicles” research project
The objectives of the Russian army in Ukraine have continuously evolved, but the main ones remain the “demilitarisation” and “denazification” of Ukraine, as well as the protection of residents of the “DNR” and “LNR.” Perhaps for this reason, even in the third year of the war, defining the main goals of the “Special Military Operation” remains a challenging task for Russians.
According to data from the state-controlled VTsIOM, 43% of Russians believe the war began to protect Russia from NATO, one in five thinks Russia is defending the Donbas “republics,” and another 15% believe Russia wants to cleanse Ukraine of Nazis.
Regional Differences in War Support
According to ExtremeScan’s research, some regions advocate for ending the war even more strongly than traditional protest centers like Moscow and St. Petersburg. Among the surveyed regions, the lowest support for the “Special Military Operation” is recorded in the Chechen Republic—only 39% of respondents expressed their support. The Republic of Tuva follows with 46% support, and slightly higher is St. Petersburg with 50%. These regions also have the highest number of respondents who avoided answering the question, which may indicate that the level of support for the “Special Military Operation” in these regions is even lower.
Level of Support for the “Special Military Operation” by Region
| Region | Support | Do Not Support | Undecided | Prefer Not to Answer |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| Nationwide | 56% | 16% | 14% | 15% |
| Moscow | 53% | 15% | 16% | 16% |
| St. Petersburg | 50% | 17% | 17% | 17% |
| Sverdlovsk Oblast | 56% | 11% | 16% | 17% |
| Krasnodar Krai | 62% | 9% | 16% | 12% |
| Belgorod Oblast | 63% | 11% | 15% | 11% |
| Republic of Bashkortostan | 56% | 12% | 17% | 15% |
| Republic of Buryatia | 51% | 14% | 18% | 17% |
| Republic of Tuva | 46% | 16% | 18% | 19% |
| Republic of Dagestan | 51% | 12% | 22% | 15% |
| Chechen Republic | 39% | 15% | 23% | 23% |
Source: ExtremeScan
According to ExtremeScan sociologists, Moscow has long supported the “Special Military Operation” because the main beneficiaries of the war—government officials and business owners who have profited from sanctions—mostly live in the capital.
In contrast, an undercurrent of resentment toward the government has emerged in Chechnya: a significant portion of people have relatives who have gone to war. They believe that more people are recruited from their republic than elsewhere in Russia.
“Chechnya is the poorest in our list, inclined against Russia, more isolated from the influence of propaganda. For them, this is someone else’s war,” notes Elena Koneva, a sociologist at ExtremeScan.
“The anti-war segment exists in Moscow, with a high concentration of activists who openly say they ‘do not support’ the war. However, overall, Moscow supports the war no less than the rest of Russia because it has a high concentration of government officials, defense industry workers, and large corporations’ employees—those who have benefited from the war or are simply loyal to their employers,” Koneva adds.
The war is alien to Russia’s national republics, according to ExtremeScan. In September 2022, Tuva and Dagestan actively protested against mobilisation. Residents were outraged that their men were overrepresented in volunteer recruitment plans: for example, Dagestan mobilized 2.6 times more men for the war than the Russian average.
An additional factor is the losses suffered by Russians at the front. Although this is a primary concern for representatives from all regions, residents of the republics perceive it more painfully than residents of megacities due to higher casualty rates in these areas. This issue is most acutely felt in the border Belgorod Oblast, where 90% of respondents noted that losses at the front are an important problem, as well as in the republics of Buryatia (90%), Dagestan (90%), Tuva (88%), and Bashkortostan (86%).
“In Chechnya, this problem is noted less frequently—only 76% of respondents said they consider deaths in the war one of the main problems of the region. However, this result is explained by the fact that, unlike other ethnic republics, ‘partial mobilisation’ was not conducted in Chechnya. In Moscow and St. Petersburg, 70% and 72% of respondents, respectively, stated the importance of losses at the front,” the sociologists explain.
Decreasing Willingness to Fight
The proportion of Russians willing to go to war voluntarily remains stable. According to the “Chronicles” project’s data, in September 2024, 14% of Russians stated their readiness to voluntarily sign a contract with the Ministry of Defense. In February 2023, this share was the same—14%. However, the number of Russians who are not ready to sign a contract at all has significantly increased: from 20% in February 2023 to 29% in September 2024. Simultaneously, the proportion of those ready to go to war by order of the Ministry of Defense is decreasing: from 42% in February 2023 to only 32% now.
If the opportunity arises, are you personally ready to participate in the Special Military Operation in Ukraine? If so, would it be voluntarily or by order of the Ministry of Defense?
Question asked to men aged 18 to 60.
| Response | February 2023 | September 2024 |
|---|---|---|
| Not Ready | 20% | 29% |
| Ready by Order of Ministry of Defense | 42% | 32% |
| Ready Voluntarily | 14% | 14% |
| Not Subject to Mobilization | 8% | 8% |
| Prefer Not to Answer | 7% | 9% |
Source: “Chronicles” research project
According to sociologists, the greatest willingness for mobilisation among men is expressed by citizens aged 50 to 60. This is precisely the age category least likely to be mobilized; the maximum service age for ordinary soldiers is 50. Among Russians aged 18–24, who are more likely to be affected by mobilisation, only 6.6% are ready to go to war by order.
The majority of Russians are not ready to condemn anyone for refusing to participate in military actions. According to ExtremeScan data, 51% of respondents treat such people with understanding, 27% with disapproval, and 22% found it difficult to express their attitude.
Preference for Peace Over Mobilisation
The prospect of continued military action evokes mixed reactions among Russians. ExtremeScan sociologists noted that the topic of possible mobilisation became relevant again after the Ukrainian Armed Forces’ incursion into the Kursk Oblast: the weak defence of the border region highlighted an acute shortage of manpower in the army. Fifty-seven percent of respondents assess the possibility of declaring mobilisation as high, and only 28% consider it low. Consequently, priorities are shifting—53% of respondents name the liberation of the Kursk Oblast, rather than advancement into Ukraine, as a primary task.
However, Russians do not want new mobilisation and are not ready for it—most would prefer to freeze the conflict. According to the “Chronicles” project data, when choosing between peace and mobilisation, almost half of the respondents—49%—advocated for ending the war without achieving the goals of the “Special Military Operation.” A new mobilisation was supported by 29% of survey participants. Another 22% refused to answer.
Data from the “Chronicles” survey indicate that most Russians at least doubt the anti-Western and pro-war narratives and definitely do not want new mobilisation. When answering the question, “Which of the following events would you have liked to happen over the past year?” (multiple choices allowed), only 22% named conducting a new mobilisation. Fifty percent of respondents would like to restore relations with Western countries, 54% favor increasing budget spending on the army, 63% desire a peace treaty with Ukraine with mutual concessions, and 65% hope for the lifting of sanctions imposed on Russia. Eighty-five percent of respondents hope that in the coming year, the authorities will focus on solving internal social and economic problems.
The most desired outcome remains the completion of the “Special Military Operation” after achieving its goals—86% of respondents supported this option. Sociologists link such a high level of support with the unwillingness of some Russians to admit defeat, even if they are wrong, as well as the fact that approximately 20% of Russians are still pro-war and consider victory without any concessions important. Nevertheless, 63% of respondents are ready for peace with mutual concessions—a record high since the beginning of the war.
Disclaimer: In times of war, it is impossible to fully trust public opinion polls—Russians may fear opposing the state’s position and propaganda. Expressing an opinion different from the general narrative can lead to real punishment: laws on “discrediting” the Armed Forces were adopted in Russia precisely for such cases. However, studying public opinion and monitoring its dynamics remain important and necessary tasks to have at least some understanding of sentiments in Russian society.
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[…] these goals appear unattainable. However, it is noted that the Russian leadership, for now, seems reluctant to initiate such a move, opting instead to rely on foreign military support and smaller-scale conscription […]