Nuclear Showdown: China’s CSS-10 Success Amid Russia’s Satan 2 Failure in Joint Tests

On 25 September, China successfully launched the DF-31AG intercontinental ballistic missile (ICBM), also known by its NATO reporting name as the CSS-10. This marked the first such launch since 1980. The missile was fired into the Pacific Ocean, a departure from previous tests, which typically targeted the Taklamakan Desert in western China.

The launch was a success not only from a technical standpoint but also politically. The trajectory of the CSS-10 passed near Guam, home to a U.S. Air Force base, and landed in the ocean near French Polynesia.

In Washington, Tokyo, and Canberra, there was “deep concern” and “serious unease,” a reaction that Beijing likely anticipated and intended to provoke.

China’s achievement stands in stark contrast to Russia’s recent failure with its RS-28 Sarmat ICBM, also known by its NATO classification as Satan 2. The Russian test at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome on 21 September was unsuccessful.

However, it would be incorrect to assume that China’s launch was a rapid response to Russia’s misstep. Instead, it appears that both Moscow and Beijing had planned to coordinate their ICBM test launches to send a joint message to the West.

This isn’t the first instance of Russian-Chinese military coordination. On 24 July, four bombers—two Russian Tu-95MS and two Chinese H-6s—flew near Alaska, operating within the NORAD zone. The Russian Ministry of Defence stated that the aircraft conducted “joint patrols over the Chukchi and Bering Seas and the northern Pacific Ocean,” with both countries “working on interaction at all stages of air patrol.”

Similarly, the joint ICBM launches planned for 21 September were meant to highlight Russian-Chinese military cooperation. Russia’s Satan 2 ICBM was supposed to be fired not towards the “Kura” test site on the Kamchatka Peninsula, but into the central Pacific Ocean, a maximum range test zone where Russian missiles are sometimes directed. This was near the area targeted by the Chinese CSS-10.

However, Russia’s failure with the Satan 2 disrupted these plans. The Chinese took a brief pause, reviewed their systems, and successfully launched the CSS-10 a few days later.

The contrast in outcomes is striking: while Russia’s “big stick” approach faltered, China’s showed its full capabilities. The joint ICBM launch scheduled for 21 September, like the joint bomber patrol on 24 July, had been coordinated by Moscow and Beijing as a display of strength ahead of the BRICS summit in Kazan, scheduled for late October.

These actions were intended to demonstrate to the U.S. and NATO that the Russian-Chinese partnership is a central force within BRICS, aiming not only to instil greater concern in Western capitals but also to enhance the appeal of the BRICS alliance for other countries. The message was clear: even NATO members, like Turkey, are expressing interest in joining BRICS.

However, the plan did not unfold as expected. Moscow’s failure left Beijing to claim the spotlight. The successful Chinese launch underscored, once again, who holds the upper hand in the Xi-Putin partnership.

In the wake of the Satan 2 failure, Putin’s attempts to “save face” included a move to escalate nuclear rhetoric through proposed doctrinal changes. Yet this shift did little to alter the situation at the Plesetsk Cosmodrome or to improve Putin’s standing.

Now, the Kremlin is contemplating its next move in the escalation, a strategy long aimed at provoking a “Cuban Missile Crisis 2.0.” However, unlike Khrushchev, who was considered a poor conflict manager, Putin hopes to secure a strategic concession from the U.S.—specifically, regarding Ukraine. Thus far, these efforts have failed, with the U.S. remaining unresponsive, even to the deployment of tactical nuclear weapons in Belarus. The Kremlin now appears to be banking on Trump and his supporters, whose intentions have become increasingly clear.