The EU is preparing to accelerate its ban on Russian liquefied natural gas (LNG), moving the deadline to January 1st, 2027 — a full year earlier than originally planned.
The official narrative frames this as a proactive step to reduce dependence on Russian energy and cut off revenue streams to Moscow. Yet reports indicate that the real impetus came not from Brussels, but from U.S. President Donald Trump. In effect, the EU is now executing policy at the behest of an external leader, highlighting both the limits of European self-direction and the European Commission’s persistent inability to set its own course.
The EU had originally scheduled the LNG phase-out for 2028, allowing member states time to adjust supply chains, invest in infrastructure, and maintain market stability. But a conversation between Ursula von der Leyen and Trump reportedly convinced Brussels to move the timetable forward. Trump’s intervention underscores a stark reality: European energy policy is increasingly reactive, shaped by the priorities of Washington rather than developed independently through careful strategy.
The strategic rationale for the accelerated ban is, on paper, compelling. Russian LNG remains a major source of revenue for Moscow, and cutting off imports is intended to reduce the Kremlin’s financial leverage amid the war in Ukraine. EU imports of Russian gas have already dropped from 45 percent in 2022 to around 19 percent today, and the bloc has diversified supplies with LNG from the U.S., Qatar, and Algeria. Accelerating the phase-out further signals commitment and cohesion, even if such cohesion has often been more rhetorical than operational.
Yet the economic realities are less flattering. Alternative LNG sources come at higher costs and often involve more complex logistics. Member states heavily reliant on Russian gas, including Hungary and Slovakia, may face difficulties securing sufficient replacement supplies. Infrastructure, from import terminals to regasification facilities, must keep pace with the accelerated schedule, or the EU risks bottlenecks and price volatility. Legal obstacles also loom, as contracts extending beyond 2027 could provoke disputes over force majeure clauses and contractual obligations.
The geopolitical dimension is equally significant. Moscow faces a meaningful reduction in energy revenue, potentially weakening its capacity to sustain military operations. But by acting under Trump’s prompting, Brussels projects a different image: one of dependency, not strategic autonomy. The optics are striking — an American president appears to be dictating policy to Europe’s most influential institutions. In doing so, he positions himself as the arbiter of EU energy decisions, while the Commission appears content to follow, rather than lead.
Internal dynamics complicate matters further. EU member states vary widely in energy dependency, infrastructure readiness, and appetite for risk. Countries facing higher reliance on Russian imports must navigate the accelerated timetable carefully, balancing industrial output, consumer energy costs, and public opinion. The Commission, already criticised for slow or fragmented policy-making, now bears the additional burden of harmonising these divergent interests under a timeline largely influenced externally.
There is also a symbolic risk. If Europe is seen as acting under external pressure rather than crafting policy independently, it could weaken Brussels’ credibility in future negotiations — whether with global energy suppliers, financial investors, or other geopolitical actors. Confidence in the EU as a coherent, self-determining bloc is a cornerstone of its influence. Subordinating energy policy to a foreign leader, however effective in enforcing sanctions, chips away at that perception.
Still, the strategic gains are tangible. Cutting Russian LNG imports reduces Moscow’s revenue, strengthens transatlantic coordination, and signals European commitment to Ukraine. If managed effectively, the accelerated ban could further diversify EU energy sources and reinforce long-term energy security. But the means — a timeline prompted by Donald Trump rather than internal strategy — leaves the bloc exposed to questions about autonomy, competence, and policy vision.
Ultimately, the EU faces a stark choice. It can implement the accelerated ban efficiently, turning an externally influenced decision into a strategic success. Or it can stumble through logistical, legal, and political obstacles, cementing the perception that Brussels reacts to external pressure while struggling to lead. The truth is already apparent: in a policy domain as critical as energy, it is Trump who is calling the shots, and the European Commission is following.
Europe has long prided itself on measured, rules-based governance. In this instance, the pace, timing, and origin of policy reveal a different reality: the Union’s energy strategy, for now, is not driven from within. It is dictated from abroad, a reminder that in the absence of decisive leadership, even the most ambitious policy objectives can become exercises in reaction rather than initiative.
Trump says Europe “talks, not acts” on Russia sanctions, urges halt to energy purchases
