The United States has issued a general licence authorising certain transactions with Belarus’s state airline, Belavia, after Minsk released 52 prisoners.
The move, announced by US presidential envoy John Coale and formalised by the Treasury’s Office of Foreign Assets Control (OFAC) as General License No. 11, allows the carrier to service and procure aircraft parts but does not amount to a wholesale delisting. EU restrictions on Belavia remain in place.
OFAC’s licence specifies that other US export controls continue to apply, including the International Traffic in Arms Regulations and the Export Administration Regulations. In practice, this enables limited commercial transactions—such as maintenance and safety-related parts purchases—without reopening broader financial channels or lifting other sanctions designations. Coale said Washington also aims to reopen its embassy in Minsk as relations are recalibrated.
Belarus’s prisoner releases, confirmed by US and regional officials, were presented by Minsk as a confidence-building gesture. Critics argue that selective releases have not addressed systemic repression or the large number of detainees who remain in custody. The timing has nonetheless created momentum for a narrow easing targeted at the flag carrier.
The decision has drawn scrutiny because Belarus is tightly integrated with Russia through the Union State arrangement and the Eurasian Economic Union (EAEU), a customs bloc that includes Russia and Kazakhstan. Policymakers in Brussels and several Member States warn that any relaxation for Belarus could create channels for sanctions circumvention across a common customs space, particularly in dual-use goods. The EU has repeatedly tightened measures to reduce such leakage.
In June 2024 the EU extended restrictions on Belarus to align them more closely with those on Russia, citing the need to close what officials called one of the biggest loopholes in the sanctions regime. Subsequent packages strengthened anti-circumvention tools and due-diligence obligations for exporters, targeting indirect routes via third countries. These efforts remain in force irrespective of Washington’s limited licence for Belavia.
Experts on sanctions enforcement note that trade flows through Central Asia and the wider EAEU have been used to source components for Russia since 2022, notwithstanding increased Western outreach and enforcement pressure. Any resumption of aviation-related transactions with Belavia therefore prompts questions about end-use and end-user controls, and about how effectively compliance can be monitored once parts leave US or allied jurisdictions.
It is also important to distinguish between licensing of transactions and the restoration of air links. The OFAC step does not automatically reinstate routes to the United States or Europe; air services depend on separate safety, regulatory and market approvals, as well as EU and national restrictions that continue to bar Belavia from European airspace. Reports indicate the US measure is limited to maintenance and parts, including for Boeing aircraft, rather than a comprehensive reopening.
Regional reactions have been mixed. Lithuania’s foreign minister called the US move a test of EU sanctions policy, while opposition figures in exile warned that an approach seen as transactional could be misread in Minsk and Moscow. Washington insists the licence will not facilitate Russian sanctions evasion and frames it as contingent diplomacy tied to further humanitarian steps, alongside a stated intent to restore a diplomatic presence in Minsk.
The policy trade-off is clear. Targeted relief may encourage additional prisoner releases and provide leverage for re-engagement on consular and humanitarian files. At the same time, a permissive channel—even a narrow one—risks being exploited within an integrated customs area where enforcement capacity is uneven and diversion incentives are high. The durability of the approach will hinge on verification, rapid revocation mechanisms, and close coordination with EU partners who have spent the past year tightening anti-circumvention rules. For aviation specifically, robust end-use checks, serialised tracking of components and transparent maintenance records will be central to assessing real-world impact.
For now, the United States has not lifted Belarus or Belavia from wider sanctions frameworks; it has authorised specified dealings under a time-bound general licence. Whether that calibration survives first contact with practical enforcement—and whether Minsk delivers further, verifiable steps—will determine if the move is seen as pragmatic diplomacy or as a gap in a sanctions architecture still under strain from attempted workarounds. Coordination with Brussels will shape the next steps.
