Investigative journalists from The Insider have uncovered nearly 19,000 of Tatjana Ždanoka’s emails, shedding light on her extensive collaboration with the Kremlin.
In January, The Insider, in collaboration with its investigative partner Re:Baltica, unveiled revelations about Ždanoka’s covert involvement as an agent of the FSB spanning nearly a decade.
These disclosures were grounded in a select collection of emails exchanged between Ždanoka and alleged FSB handler Sergey Beltyukov, alongside another FSB handler.
Prompted by The Insider’s investigation, the European Parliament initiated an inquiry resulting in disciplinary measures, including monetary sanctions amounting to €1,750 imposed on Ždanoka.
Additionally, her activities as an MEP were curtailed. Concurrently, an ongoing investigation by the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) further scrutinises the matter.
The Insider and Re:Baltica can now reveal more of Ždanoka’s connivance with Russian intelligence, based on an even larger tranche of her correspondence with Putin’s spies.
Dmitry Gladey.
Specifically, Ždanoka corresponded with Beltyukov from 2013 until 2017, according to the almost 19,000 emails The Insider and Re:Baltica have examined.
She also communicated with another FSB case officer, Dmitry Gladey, her longtime contact and first handler from the Fifth Service.
Unveiling Ždanoka’s Role in the Kyiv Unrest in 2014: MEP’s Collaboration with Russian Intelligence
In January 2014, Kyiv was a cauldron of unrest following President Viktor Yanukovych’s abrupt decision to reject an association agreement with the European Union, under intense pressure from Moscow.
This reversal, after years of promising closer ties with the West, sparked massive protests, with demonstrators occupying Maidan Nezalezhnosti, Kyiv’s central square, and demanding Yanukovych honour his commitment.
The situation escalated when, on 16th January, Yanukovych enacted a series of laws curbing the right to protest, inciting further anger and leading to the first fatalities in clashes with Ukrainian security forces.
In response, the European Parliament dispatched an urgent fact-finding mission to Kyiv on 28th January. This delegation, which included Tatjana Ždanoka, met with various stakeholders including President Yanukovych, opposition leaders, and religious figures.
Upon their return, the delegation reported back to the European Parliament in Strasbourg on 30th January, prompting a resolution that called for an end to the repression and the release of detained protestors.
Contrary to her responsibilities as an MEP, Ždanoka did not share her findings with her fellow legislators. Instead, she sent a detailed report to Sergey Beltyukov, an operative with the FSB, Russia’s Federal Security Service.
Her confidential dispatches provided insights into the ongoing unrest and the political climate in Ukraine, emphasizing that the Maidan protestors, two months into their movement, were unlikely to disperse anytime soon.
Ždanoka’s report to Beltyukov, dated 6th February, painted a complex picture of her observations in Kyiv. “My impressions are contradictory,” she wrote.
“Yanukovych is too cunning to be unravelled in the course of a 1.5-hour conversation.
“But the feeling is that he is ready for a forceful scenario… On the other hand, some observers are inclined to believe that Yanukovych will sign a treaty with the EU very soon, getting maximum bonuses from all sides.
“He looked quite cheerful, calm and confident in his meeting with us on Monday.
“I thought he should have been more confused… [A]s far as the Maidan is concerned — where we walked on Sunday late in the evening, my feelings are mixed: some mixture of farce, drama, horror and comedy (with a preponderance of the third component in this list). It’s not going to all dissipate that easily.”
Beltyukov’s response was brief but appreciative: “Thank you!!!”
It is not clear what Beltyukov, an officer of Russia’s Federal Security Service (FSB), did with this private intelligence report from a member of the European Parliament (MEP), nor what role it may have played in shaping the Kremlin’s measures in the following days.
However, two weeks later the FSB dispatched its own delegation to Kyiv, led by Sergey Beseda, the head of the organisation’s Fifth Service, its foreign intelligence arm.
By Mstyslav Chernov/Unframe/http://www.unframe.com/ – Own work, CC BY-SA 3.0, https://commons.wikimedia.org/w/index.php?curid=31307301
Their mission was to pressure Yanukovych not to entertain an accommodation with the protesters, but rather to crack down harder on them.
The following evening would see the bloodiest hours of Ukraine’s Euromaidan Revolution, with at least 21 protesters killed by snipers.
By the end of February 2014, the embattled Ukrainian president would defect to Russia, and Russia would mount a stealth invasion and seizure of Crimea, kick-starting a war that, through periods of intensification and lulls, continues to the present day.
The Odesa Tragedy and the Shadow of Espionage
Among the new findings in this tranche of emails is a message indicating that someone named “Dmitry,” writing from an unknown address (group2may@gmail.com), assigned Ždanoka an assistant: Odesa-born student Yulia Satirova.
The “group2may” account, which appears to be a reference to the fire that killed 42 pro-Russian demonstrators in Odesa’s trade unions building on 2nd May 2014, was used by three different people, none of whom The Insider and The Insider could identify. When asked if “Dmitry” was in fact her handler Gladey, Ždanoka did not respond.
Records show that Satirova did work for the European Parliament between 2015 and 2019, not only for Ždanoka but also for two other politicians: Miroslavs Mitrofanovs, a Latvian parliamentarian and a member of the Latvian Russian Union, Ždanoka’s pro-Kremlin party, and Jiří Maštálka, a Communist MEP from Czechia.
For the past six months, Ždanoka has denied cooperating with the FSB. She answered questions sent to her for this story on a YouTube livestream but said little about the substance of The Insider and The Insider’s queries — other than to label the new leaked emails as fake. This claim contradicts statements she made after the first investigation about her ties to the FSB.
Further complicating the situation, Ždanoka’s denial and counter-accusations have cast a shadow over the European Parliament’s response.
The inquiry into her actions resulted in limited sanctions and a nominal fine, reflecting the complexities of addressing espionage allegations against an elected official.
As the Latvian State Security Service (VDD) continues its investigation, the extent of Ždanoka’s espionage activities remains under scrutiny, raising questions about the broader implications for European security and political integrity.
The full impact of Ždanoka’s actions and her collaboration with the FSB will likely unfold as more details emerge from ongoing investigations. For now, the revelation of her deep ties with Russian intelligence underscores the persistent threat of espionage and the intricate web of political influence that extends far beyond Latvia’s borders.
Ždanoka’s letters to Beltyukov are short and businesslike. Both largely used email to arrange meetings, preferring to discuss substantive issues in person. Despite the formality, the FSB officer often sent warm wishes to Ždanoka on New Year’s and her birthday. He would personally meet her at the airport in St. Petersburg, not forgetting to flatter her.
In one letter, Beltyukov praised Ždanoka for appearing on Russian state television channels, calling her interventions, presumably about Ukraine, “very important in the current situation.”
In exchange for participating in propagandist Vladimir Solovyov’s television program, she was given a car for the day, and an acquaintance booked an appointment for her at a hairdresser. At the end of 2013, the two met in the Moscow cafe “Shokoladnitsa” near the Lubyanka crossing, close to the FSB headquarters.
The busiest period of exchanges between the Latvian national and Beltyukov came in 2014, when Russia annexed Crimea and fomented a barely plausible deniable war in the eastern Ukrainian Donbas region.
Almost a decade later, these events would culminate in the full-scale Russian invasion of February 2022.
In late summer 2014, Beltyukov asked whether Ždanoka “could organise an event on a European platform (for example, a photo exhibition) with documentary evidence of war crimes in south-eastern Ukraine. If you have such an idea, I am ready to join you.”
“Of course, Sergei, it is possible,” she replied. “Thank you for your offer to help. But how can I find out more about your assistance?” The question seemed to be about money.
At that time, Ždanoka was preparing to hold a hearing at the European Parliament on the then-recent tragedy in Odesa. In May 2014, a building in which pro-Russian protesters had barricaded themselves caught fire amid clashes with pro-Ukrainian demonstrators.
Participants from both sides could be seen throwing Molotov cocktails. In the resulting fire, 42 people were killed, and more than 200 injured. The incident in Odesa is one of the central themes in Kremlin propaganda that attempts to brand all Ukrainian nationalists “fascists” and “Nazis.”
“The date is linked to the events in Odesa, but we will try to draw attention to current events in south-east Ukraine,” Ždanoka assured Beltyukov. She continued to organise events dedicated to the Odesa tragedy for several years afterward.
At the end of 2014, Beltyukov wrote, “You may soon be contacted by D.G. There is an opportunity to apply for a grant offered through St. Petersburg State University. At first glance, the idea seems interesting.”
Ždanoka replied that D.G. had already called her. She added that, “I look forward to meeting our mutual acquaintance in Riga.”
D.G. is most likely Dmitry Gladey, Ždanoka’s recruiter and first handler in the FSB.
The Latvian MEP previously told The Insider that he is an old friend with whom she took skiing lessons in the Caucasus in the 1970s, back when they were students. They continued to meet in St. Petersburg, where Gladey and his wife lived. They also met in Riga when Gladey’s daughter married a Latvian man.
Recently, The Insider revealed that Gladey was a member of the FSB’s Fifth Service, the group tasked in 2004 with countering the “colour revolutions” that had set Georgia and Ukraine on the path to democracy.
The Fifth Service was also responsible for destabilising Ukraine in advance of the full-scale invasion in 2022. The Insider has obtained correspondence between Ždanoka and Gladey from 2005 to 2013.
The exchanges do not sound like normal chatting between friends. For instance, Ždanoka reported to Gladey about events she had organised, who had been invited, trips she had taken, and observations she had made.
Ždanoka’s Manipulation of Latvia’s March 16th Commemoration
One example is an annual event built around 16th March, the calendar date that Latvian nationalists commemorate for legionnaires who were recruited by Nazi Germany to fight against the Soviet Union during World War II.
During their annual march to lay flowers at the Freedom monument in Latvia’s capital, pro-Russian activists who call themselves “anti-fascists” always try to stage a protest.
In 2005, Ždanoka organised provocations at these events in order to “prove” to her colleagues in Europe that Latvia still harbours Nazi sympathies.
That year, “anti-fascists” dressed up as Jewish concentration camp inmates — replete with yellow stars on their chests — attended the festivities, providing ready-made material for Russia’s TV channels.
Gladey’s questions indicate he was aware of the plans before the protest took place. Ždanoka was to organise the confrontations, photograph them, and send news to her colleagues in the European Parliament centred on the claim that Nazis were now marching in Latvia’s capital.
“I hope you managed to get some rest?” Gladey messaged his agent. “I look forward to the promised updates on the 16th March article – the text of your statement, the reactions of MEPs, and the consequences.”
“We had a restful break, but it wasn’t without its excitement,” Ždanoka replied. “I’ve sent out the texts and accompanying photos. The initial brief was dispatched on 16th March to the Greens group (53 people) in my circle.
“A more detailed report was shared on 17 March, distributed to the same Greens group and an additional minority issues group (42 people). We anticipate the full spectrum of MEP reactions by next week.”
Until April 2022, Ždanoka was affiliated with the Greens/European Free Alliance group in the European Parliament.
Accompanying her correspondence were photographs capturing Ždanoka’s supporters, donning costumes, being detained by Latvian authorities.
Among them, one striking image depicted swastika-adorned posters strewn across the ground. In contrast, only a single photo showcased the actual Legionnaires in attendance — elderly gentlemen standing serenely with flowers in hand.
Ždanoka also forwarded Gladey a statement she had circulated among her fellow European Parliament members. In it, “the MEP expresses her outrage” at the police’s use of violence “against anti-fascist protesters.” Additionally, the attachments included a response from other Latvian MEPs, denouncing Ždanoka’s release as a “masterpiece of demagoguery.”
Moldova’s Wine Ban: A Pawn in Russia’s Geopolitical Chess Game
In September 2013, Moldova, one of Eastern Europe’s most impoverished nations, faced a significant economic setback when Russia imposed a ban on the import of its wines, ostensibly due to quality control issues.
However, the true motive behind Russia’s actions was to exert economic pressure to thwart the signing of a cooperation agreement between Moldova and the EU at the Eastern European Partnership Summit in Vilnius the following month.
The roots of these developments trace back to 2009 when the EU established the Eastern Partnership (EaP) to extricate countries on its eastern border from Russia’s influence. Moscow deployed various tactics, including trade restrictions, information warfare, and a halt on natural gas supplies, to thwart the initiative.
As an MEP, Ždanoka frequently journeyed to the EaP countries and relayed her observations to Gladey. Consequently, the FSB had a well-positioned operative at crucial European gatherings, particularly those pertaining to the potential integration of Western-leaning countries within the Kremlin’s purported “near abroad.”
In the summer of 2010, Ždanoka initially forwarded Gladey a detailed program outlining the itinerary for the visit of deputies from potential EaP countries to Brussels.
Subsequently, she provided an insightful summary to Gladey on the inclinations of participant countries concerning the inclusion of Russian ally Belarus in the project.
“I’ve reviewed my notes,” she wrote to Gladey on June 24, 2010. “Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan are staunchly in favour of full Belarusian membership, while Ukraine and Moldova seem willing to accept the ‘compromises’ proposed by the European Parliament… However, all appear open to initiating work without Belarus.”
A few months later, Ždanoka, alongside other MEPs, embarked on a trip to Moldova. In her report to Gladey, she provided a comprehensive overview of attendees, discussions held, and the dynamics between various politicians.
Ždanoka noted a scheduled lunch hosted by Moldova’s then-President Mihai Ghimpu, who was absent due to illness. His place was taken by a deputy who harboured a thinly veiled antipathy towards Ghimpu, jokingly attributing the president’s ailment to the weekend wine festival.
In 2012, Ždanoka journeyed to Azerbaijan. Ahead of such visits, MEPs received extensive briefing materials containing analyses of the host country’s economy and politics, CVs of senior officials, information on international fund support, and briefings on key issues such as the suppression of protest movements. Ždanoka shared the comprehensive 70-page report with Gladey.
While these documents were not classified, they were sensitive and intended solely for MEP delegations, not for public consumption, let alone Russian intelligence.
The climax came in Vilnius in November 2013, when the EU intended to sign cooperation agreements with several Eastern Partnership countries amidst escalating pressure from Russia.
Moscow had imposed bans on wine imports from Moldova and chocolate from Ukraine and threatened to sever gas supplies—a dire scenario given the impending winter.
Consequently, the MEPs convened in Vilnius agreed to adopt a resolution denouncing Russia’s coercive tactics. Ždanoka promptly relayed this resolution to her FSB contact. “In the interim, I am dispatching the draft resolution drafted by the Greens. While I don’t have access to drafts from other groups, this one should provide you with a sense.
“Tomorrow, a compromise will be negotiated and agreed upon with several groups. The debate is scheduled for Wednesday, with the vote on Thursday.”
Two days later, Ždanoka furnished Gladey with the final version of the resolution and the text of her speech.
In it, she acknowledged Russia’s pressure tactics but also highlighted what she portrayed as the EU’s duplicity. She cited the predicament of Moldova, unable to export wine to Russia with no alternative market provided by the EU.
By drawing parallels with Latvia’s EU accession, she implied that Moldova would fare better aligning with Russia—a message consistent with Kremlin propaganda prevalent in the Baltics.
“I am dismayed,” remarked former German MEP Rebecca Harms, who led Ždanoka’s EP group, upon learning of the emails.
“They make it evident that she wasn’t merely expressing an alternative viewpoint on Russia-related matters but was indeed an informant. I regret not being able to garner enough support to expel her from the Green group.”
Ždanoka’s Strategic Guidance to FSB: Shaping Russia’s Foreign Influence Agenda
A Western intelligence officer told The Insider, “The FSB’s Fifth Service is tasked with operations abroad, and recruiting or cultivating agents in politics is among their preferred strategies. Their objective isn’t solely gathering intelligence but also exerting influence on society and decision-makers concerning Russian foreign policy.”
Ždanoka didn’t just report on contemporary events; she also provided constructive advice to Russian intelligence on how to enhance its effectiveness in influencing European political affairs. In an email dated October 1st, 2009, Ždanoka forwarded Gladey an analysis critiquing the shortcomings of certain structures impacting Russia’s image abroad.
She highlighted the unpreparedness of Russian diplomats to engage with the media, noting their vulnerability to being “outflanked” by their Baltic and Georgian counterparts—youthful, dynamic individuals trained in the West and fluent in foreign languages.
Ždanoka cited instances such as Estonia’s 2007 “Bronze Soldier” episode and the 2008 Russo-Georgian war to illustrate Moscow’s diplomatic ineptitude in shaping global perceptions.
In her analysis, Ždanoka also criticised Russian officials for treating foreign trips as leisure jaunts, observing a prevailing “arrogant attitude” among them, summed up as: “Russia has gas and oil, so you have to respect us.”
She proposed establishing a dedicated ministry to bolster Russia’s image abroad, drawing parallels with the Latvian Institute, predominantly staffed by Latvians with international backgrounds who adeptly communicate with foreigners.
Simultaneously, she advocated for her own initiatives, suggesting that personnel for the proposed ministry could be sourced from the European Russian Forum (ERF), an event she orchestrated in Brussels for several years.
The ERF served as a platform for Ždanoka to host significant Russian officials, with representatives from the Moscow Mayor’s Office, the Russian Orthodox Church, and her political group in parliament among its founding members. Funders included the Russian Foreign Ministry and the Russkiy Mir (Russian World) Foundation.
Through the ERF and associated activities, Ždanoka facilitated the ingress of various individuals into the European Parliament, including Russian politicians subject to sanctions, suspected agents of influence, and figures with ties to Russian security services.
These efforts contributed to whitewashing Russia’s image among certain MEPs and provided content for Kremlin-aligned media, with a prevailing message that the EU should cultivate friendly relations with Russia.
Latvian MEP Sandra Kalniete remarked, “What is typical of her and a number of other MPs who work in that pro-Russian style is that the Moscow media exploits it.”
Despite this, Kalniete and other MEPs suggested that Ždanoka’s political impact in the EP remained marginal. Another long-serving Latvian MEP, Roberts Zīle, emphasised the significance of expanding the European Russian Forum to disseminate the concept of the “Russian world” in the West.
***
Following revelations by The Insider and its partners regarding her collaboration with Russian special services, Ždanoka faced scrutiny from Latvia’s security service (VDD) and was fined €1,750 by the European Parliament.
She refuted claims of punishment for errors in official declarations. In a YouTube address responding to The Insider’s questions, Ždanoka defended herself as “an agent of peace” and dismissed suggestions of relocating to Russia, asserting her usefulness in Riga, her birthplace.
Read also:
Tatjana Ždanoka: investigation launched into Latvian MEP’s alleged ties with Russian Intelligence
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