U.S. media report that President Donald Trump has told confidants he misjudged Vladimir Putin’s willingness to pursue peace and now doubts his own ability to influence the Kremlin leader.
The turning point was the 15 August summit in Anchorage. The meeting produced no agreement, and public signals since have not indicated movement from Moscow towards a ceasefire.
Days later, microphones caught a fragment of an exchange at the White House as leaders gathered for follow-on talks: Trump told France’s Emmanuel Macron that Putin “wants to make a deal.” The hot-mic moment underscored the President’s reading of his Alaska session even as European officials cautioned that evidence of de-escalation was lacking.
The battlefield and airspace realities have cut against that reading. Poland reported Russian drones entering its airspace and shot some down, prompting NATO to bolster its eastern posture. Romania has separately scrambled jets after a drone breach during Russian strikes on Ukraine. These incidents have been treated in Warsaw and Bucharest as deliberate probes, not errors of navigation.
Trump’s public posture has shifted from personal persuasion to burden-sharing conditions. He now links “major” U.S. sanctions to allied actions, urging NATO states to halt purchases of Russian oil and proposing steep, alliance-wide tariffs on China. Whatever their intent, these statements signal that any new American economic pressure will be contingent on European moves that are politically and technically complex.
The President has also pressed Ukraine to “make a deal.” After Anchorage, Reuters reported that Trump told Volodymyr Zelenskyy that Putin wanted more territory and that Kyiv had to consider concessions. That message contrasts with European positions that stress sustained pressure on Russia and robust security guarantees for Ukraine as prerequisites for any settlement.
Critics argue that the White House over-weighted signals gleaned from a single summit and under-weighted Russia’s observable conduct: continued offensive operations, large-scale bombardment, and the widening risk to NATO territory through drone incursions. On this record, the claim—reported by Axios—that Trump misjudged Putin’s appetite for a deal is consistent with outcomes since mid-August.
Policy options now narrow to three imperfect paths. First, a coordinated sanctions push with Europe and like-minded partners—hard to stage quickly given uneven global energy flows and the persistence of non-Western buyers. Second, material increases in military support to alter the battlefield balance—an approach backed by many European leaders but not yet adopted by Washington at scale post-Anchorage. Third, renewed diplomacy absent signs that Moscow will reciprocate—unlikely to deliver more than time. Reporting after the summit emphasised that Putin secured optics without binding commitments, while the United States held back from immediate escalation.
For European capitals, the drone incidents have reinforced a familiar conclusion: deterrence must be credible before negotiations can be productive. For Kyiv, the signal is starker still: absent pressure that changes calculations in the Kremlin, calls to “make a deal” amount to urging concessions under fire. For Washington, the practical effect of a misreading in August has been a visible loss of leverage in September.
Whether the administration can recover that leverage depends on choices in the coming days: if sanctions are to be tightened, clear U.S.–EU synchronisation will be required; if military aid is to be expanded, timelines must reflect battlefield tempo; and if diplomacy is to proceed, it will need to include Ukraine and be backed by enforceable security guarantees. Until then, Russia’s actions—rather than any private assurances—continue to set the pace.
After drone incursions, Poland halts Lublin flights and deploys fighter patrols
