Despite the European Union’s sweeping sanctions regime against Russia over its full-scale invasion of Ukraine, a prominent Russian oligarch continues to operate steel plants within EU territory, while simultaneously supplying raw materials to Russia’s military-industrial complex.
An investigation by Ukrainian news outlet Ukrainska Pravda has revealed that Vladimir Lisin, chairman and majority owner of Novolipetsk Steel (NLMK), remains unsanctioned by the EU — even as his enterprises contribute directly to both European and Russian markets.
On 13 and 14 March 2025, Ukrainian investigative journalist Mykhailo Tkach visited two steel plants located in Belgium: one in La Louvière and the other in Clabecq, on the outskirts of Brussels. Both are operated by NLMK, the flagship enterprise of Lisin’s global steel empire. According to Eurostat, these Belgian facilities alone imported Russian-produced semi-finished steel slabs worth a combined €1.3 billion in 2024.
The slabs originate in Russia, loaded at the port of St Petersburg and delivered to the Belgian port of Gent. Photographic evidence obtained by Ukrainska Pravda confirms recent deliveries of Russian steel to Belgian shores. Drone footage captured by the Ukrainian journalists shows operations continuing unabated at both sites.
At the same time, Lisin’s Russian plant — Novolipetsk Steel, located in Lipetsk — has been a key supplier to at least 22 facilities within Russia’s defence sector, according to confidential corporate databases reviewed by Ukrainska Pravda. These include producers of cruise and ballistic missiles, drones, radar systems, and equipment linked to Russia’s nuclear weapons programme.
Between 2022 and 2024, Novolipetsk Steel provided electrical steel — an essential component in the manufacturing of missile systems and drones — to clients such as the Avangard Moscow Machine-Building Plant (producer of S-400 missiles), the Strela production facility (which manufactures Oniks and Malakhit cruise missiles), and the Kazan Electric Device Plant (linked to the production of Orlan-10 UAVs).
All 22 of these facilities are subject to EU sanctions.
Despite this, Lisin himself has avoided inclusion on the EU’s sanctions list, making him a notable exception among high-profile Russian business figures. Other oligarchs, such as Roman Abramovich, have been sanctioned, although their companies have continued to sell products such as steel into European markets. In Abramovich’s case, slabs from the Novokuznetsk Steel Plant were observed arriving in the Polish port of Gdańsk as recently as 17 March 2025, en route to the Czech Republic.
The continued purchase of Russian steel by EU member states occurs against a backdrop of repeated affirmations by European leaders of their commitment to Ukraine’s sovereignty and security. Yet data from Eurostat show that the EU has imported nearly €10 billion worth of products from Russia’s mining and metallurgical sector since the start of the full-scale invasion in February 2022.
The case of Vladimir Lisin is of particular note. Not only does his firm continue to export to and operate within the EU, but his steel also directly supports Russia’s war effort — a duality that, according to critics, undermines the credibility and effectiveness of the EU’s sanctions regime.
The investigation suggests that the failure to sanction Lisin may be linked to his extensive business footprint in Western Europe. NLMK owns or co-owns facilities in Belgium, Italy and Denmark, employing local workforces and integrating into European supply chains. These business interests, while legal under current EU sanctions legislation, create a policy contradiction: one that allows critical materials to flow in both directions, from Russia to Europe and from Russia to its armed forces.
According to the Ukrainian outlet’s findings, the scale of Lisin’s operations is significant. Approximately 60% of semi-finished steel slab imports into the EU over the past three years have originated from Russia, with NLMK being a major contributor.
The metallurgical sector is Russia’s third largest source of revenue after oil and gas. As such, continued trade in this area has a direct impact on the Kremlin’s financial ability to sustain its military operations. Russia’s defence budget has increased annually since the invasion began, despite sanctions designed to reduce the state’s access to hard currency and critical imports.
Officials in Poland, Germany and other NATO countries have warned of a growing military threat from Russia, with some predicting that the Kremlin may seek to test NATO unity before the end of the decade. Despite such warnings, the flow of sanctioned and non-sanctioned goods — including liquefied natural gas and metallurgical products — continues largely unimpeded into EU ports.
The report concludes with a call for greater scrutiny of ongoing trade links that financially support the Russian state, and questions the lack of public explanation for the EU’s decision not to sanction Lisin. As Ukraine faces renewed missile attacks, some of which are carried out using weapons produced with steel from Lisin’s plants, Ukrainian officials and journalists alike are raising concerns over Europe’s continued economic engagement with key elements of Russia’s war machine.
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