Europe’s rearmament is no longer an abstract policy debate conducted in Brussels committees and defence ministries. It is becoming a direct test of political will, industrial resilience and public trust.
The European Commission’s decision to invest €1.07 billion in 57 European Defence Fund projects, including drones, counter-drone systems, artificial intelligence and cyber defence, reflects a continent trying to adapt to the military lessons of the war in Ukraine. Yet it also comes at a moment when Russia is seeking to make European defence production itself a source of fear.
Moscow’s recent warnings against European companies involved in drone production for Ukraine mark a significant development in the pressure campaign surrounding the war. Russia’s Defence Ministry has published a list of factories and enterprises in European countries which it alleges produce drones or drone components for Ukraine. Dmitry Medvedev, deputy chairman of Russia’s Security Council, then said the named facilities amounted to potential targets for Russia’s armed forces. The Kremlin has not formally announced an intention to strike EU or NATO territory, but it has described European drone co-operation with Ukraine as evidence of growing involvement in the conflict.
This is the context in which Europe’s defence expansion must now be understood. The argument is no longer simply about whether Europe should spend more on security. It is about whether Europe can build the industrial capacity required for deterrence while resisting the attempt by Russia to define such capacity as escalation. Moscow’s message is aimed not only at governments, but at companies, workers, local communities, insurers and voters. It seeks to turn every factory, warehouse and research centre linked to Ukrainian defence needs into a domestic political problem inside Europe.
That does not mean the risks are imaginary. Defence spending at speed always carries governance risks. Large budgets, urgent operational demands and classified procurement procedures can create opportunities for abuse. Ukraine has faced serious procurement scandals during the war, including cases involving defective equipment and alleged financial losses. NATO’s own procurement structures have also come under scrutiny, with investigations into alleged irregularities linked to defence contracts, including ammunition and drones.
These cases should not be dismissed as incidental. Corruption in defence procurement is not merely a financial offence; it can cost lives, weaken trust and damage the credibility of military support. If European governments are asking citizens to accept higher defence spending, they must also provide stronger audit mechanisms, clearer parliamentary oversight and stricter safeguards against conflicts of interest. The answer to corruption risk, however, is not strategic paralysis. It is cleaner procurement, not the abandonment of defence production.
The same distinction applies to the physical risks created by the expansion of drone warfare. In March, drones linked to Ukrainian operations reportedly entered Estonian and Latvian airspace, with one striking a chimney at the Auvere power plant in Estonia. Officials said the incidents appeared to be unintended and caused no major damage or casualties. They nevertheless underlined a real problem: long-range drone warfare can cross borders, especially in a region affected by electronic warfare, jamming and contested airspace.
Such incidents require practical responses. Europe needs better air surveillance, faster attribution mechanisms, stronger civil protection planning and greater co- ordination between military and civilian authorities. Industrial sites involved in sensitive defence production will also require more robust physical and cyber security. These are serious questions of public safety. They should be addressed directly, not obscured by either complacent reassurance or alarmist rhetoric.
The more difficult issue is Russia’s attempt to transform these legitimate concerns into a weapon of political intimidation. By publishing alleged company locations and suggesting that such facilities may become targets, Moscow is trying to impose a cost on European support for Ukraine before any military action is taken. The strategic purpose is clear: to make European governments hesitate, to make companies reconsider contracts, and to make citizens fear that support for Ukraine will bring war closer to their own streets.
This is not a new Russian method, but the focus on defence companies gives it sharper relevance. Moscow has used similar language in relation to other European defence decisions, including warnings that states hosting French nuclear-capable aircraft would make themselves targets in the event of conflict. The recurring message is that European security measures are themselves dangerous, while Russian threats are presented as a predictable response.
Europe should not ignore such warnings, but nor should it accept their logic. There is a distinction between assessing escalation risk and allowing an adversary to dictate policy through threats. If the mere production of drones, ammunition or air defence systems for Ukraine is treated as too dangerous because Moscow says it may retaliate, then Russia will have secured influence over European industrial policy without firing a missile at the European Union.
The central challenge is therefore one of political discipline. Europe must strengthen its defence industry while making procurement cleaner, facilities safer and public communication more honest. Citizens are entitled to know that rearmament carries costs and risks. They are also entitled to know why those risks are being accepted: because Russia’s war against Ukraine has exposed the consequences of military under-capacity, fragmented supply chains and dependence on external guarantees.
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