Russia’s drone strike on Ukraine’s Brody pumping station halted oil transit through the Druzhba (Friendship) pipeline and exposed a political dispute over continued Russian crude supplies to Hungary and Slovakia.
The key fact: on the night of 27 January 2026 the Russian Federation struck with a drone a linear production-and-dispatch station of Ukrtransnafta in Brody — the main oil pumping station on the Ukrainian section of the “Druzhba” pipeline. It is the most powerful on the route, with a large tank farm. After the strike, a major fire broke out; the burning of crude oil in the largest tank, with a capacity of 75,000 cubic metres, lasted for 10 days. In other words, this was a strike on a “control and pumping hub”, which led to the station’s operations being halted and, accordingly, the pumping of Russian oil in transit being stopped.
Many people say they do not see logic in Russia’s actions — why strike a facility that pumps Russia’s own oil, even if formally rebranded as Hungarian, to the Kremlin’s loyal satrapies in the EU and NATO — the regimes of Orbán and Fico? In fact, the Kremlin’s logic underwent a certain transformation as far back as last year. Moreover, it was never about pleasing satrapies. Satrapies are not pleased; they are used. Up to a certain point, until priorities change. So: the change in priorities — more precisely, the addition of priority targets in Ukraine’s energy infrastructure for the Russian Federation — happened last year. After the final disabling of the Kremenchuk refinery in June 2025, the oil produced in Ukraine by Ukrnafta was directed for export. Along the same “Druzhba”, via the Brody station. Since Russia proceeds from the aim of inflicting maximum damage on Ukraine’s energy potential, the expanded list of targets in the power sector and the gas sector was joined by oil production and transport facilities — that is, what sits within the system of Naftogaz of Ukraine and is operated by its subsidiaries Ukrnafta and Ukrtransnafta.
Unlike Ukrenergo, the electricity transmission system operator, which under former chief executive Volodymyr Kudrytskyi prioritised engineering protection for key assets, the Naftogaz group did not put comparable measures in place for oil transport facilities. It is indicative that, under the Naftogaz group’s then leadership — referred to in the so-called “Mindich tapes” as “Che Guevara” [Editor’s note: reference to Oleksii Chernyshov] — engineering protection for key oil-transport assets was not treated as a priority. It is indicative that only in January 2026 (!) did Ukrtransnafta produce its first “pretty slides” with ideas for engineering protection of facilities. Although this should have been done first of all, since the first hits on oil transport facilities took place as early as October 2022 (!) — the Chyzhivka station on the same “Druzhba”.
Therefore it is no coincidence that, having hit transit via “Druzhba”, Russia immediately proposed that the satrapies in Budapest and Bratislava take Russian oil in Novorossiysk. It is clear that a special price for the Kremlin’s servants would have been preserved, despite the current tightness of oil revenues.
Indeed, oil can be delivered by tankers to the Croatian terminal at Omišalj and from there pumped via the “Adria” pipeline to the refineries in Százhalombatta and Bratislava. However, Orbán and Fico did not like this. Why? Because combined logistics with two transhipments would “eat” almost the entire discount from Putin on the feedstock, and being endlessly “generous” is not his style. Orbán has elections in April. Fico also feels uncertain under opposition pressure. Hence the old records from Budapest and Bratislava, conducted from Moscow: “Ukraine is to blame for everything”, “Ukraine has interrupted transit”.
Budapest and Bratislava turned to Croatia with a request to help with the transit of Russian oil. Credit where it is due: Croatia’s economy minister, Ante Šušnjar, rejected such a possibility, stressing that the purchase of Russian oil in effect finances the war against Ukraine. In his words, EU countries have the technical capability to break their dependence on Russian energy resources. And on that point, he is right.
Hungary has excellent possibilities to obtain oil. On the Mediterranean market one can buy any oil, including grades close to the Russian export blend, or create one’s own blend by purchasing several grades. This was precisely the aim of MOL’s corporate policy after it reluctantly moved away from Russia in 2016, fearing negative consequences from EU sanctions against the Russian Federation after the invasion of Ukraine in 2014. In November 2019 MOL bought from Chevron a 9.57 per cent stake in the Azeri–Chirag–Gunashli (ACG) oil field in Azerbaijan, one of the world’s largest oil fields located in the Caspian Sea, as well as an 8.9 per cent stake in the Baku–Tbilisi–Ceyhan (BTC) pipeline, which transports crude from ACG to the Turkish terminal of Ceyhan on the Mediterranean. MOL also has oil production in Iraqi Kurdistan, and in other regions mentioned above. So the choice of feedstock and logistics is fairly good: take whatever oil you want, ship it by tanker to Omišalj in Croatia and from there via the “Adria” pipeline straight to the refineries in Százhalombatta and Bratislava. Only here market prices apply, not special prices tailored for Orbán, as in the case of Russian oil via “Druzhba”. And there will be no kickbacks — or there will be, but not like those from operations with Russian oil. And Orbán has elections at hand…
On logistics. In an interview with Spain’s El País in 2022, Péter Szijjártó spoke about the supposed difficulty of replacing the oil supply route from Russia. He claimed they would have to expand the capacity of the pipeline from the Adriatic Sea and they did not know how long it would take. He was openly lying.
A press release by the Hungarian company MOL dated 9 February 2015 (!) states that MOL Group and Transpetrol (the Slovak oil transport operator) completed the reconstruction and capacity expansion of the “Druzhba-1”/“Adria” pipeline branch between Százhalombatta and Ipolyság in Slovakia. Thanks to these strategic investments, Hungary, Slovakia and the Czech Republic would be able to further diversify their energy supplies, significantly improving regional energy security. MOL Group also increased the capacity of the Hungarian section of the Adria pipeline connecting the Adriatic Sea to Slovakia from 10 million tonnes per year to 14 million tonnes per year. This investment has strategic importance because it enables MOL Group to meet the oil needs of its Bratislava refinery from the Adriatic Sea. Thus, the security of supply for Hungary and Slovakia was significantly improved and the degree of their one-sided dependence was reduced. The section with expanded capacity could also contribute to the security of supply of the Czech Republic — via this route Czech refineries can also receive crude from a new source.
So Hungary has everything — both the ability to obtain any oil and the logistical possibilities. But Orbán wants precisely Russian oil and precisely via “Druzhba”. The answer as to why was inadvertently given by Szijjártó in the same El País interview in 2022, when he began to complain, offended, that “we are always presented as friends of the Russians and Putin’s spies”. A Freudian slip…
Now to our own affairs. If you try to find any official notice regarding the strike on the “Druzhba” oil transport infrastructure on 27 January, your attempts will be in vain. Not a word from any agency or company. And they should have reported it — and immediately. [Editor’s note: Reuters reported on 12 February 2026 that Ukraine’s Foreign Minister, Andrii Sybiha, said the 27 January strike on Druzhba infrastructure had halted Russian oil transit, and that there had been no public reports in recent weeks from Ukraine, Hungary or Slovakia of supply problems.] Let us turn to the EU–Ukraine Association Agreement. There is Article 276, “Supply disruption”. In it, paragraph 3 clearly states that “a Party shall not be held responsible for interruption or reduction of supply under this Article where the Party is unable to supply energy goods due to actions related to a third country…”. This Party is Ukraine. And this Party should have stated clearly and unambiguously what happened. And immediately triggered the early warning mechanism provided for by the relevant Annex to the Agreement — Annex XXVI, which defines an emergency as a situation causing significant disruption / physical stoppage in the supply of natural gas, oil or electricity between Ukraine and the European Union. The Annex clearly defines that Ukraine and the EU establish an “Early Warning Mechanism” to fix practical measures aimed at prevention and rapid response to emergencies or the threat of an emergency. It is set out clearly: “This includes early assessment of potential risks and problems related to demand and supply of natural gas, oil or electricity and warning and rapid reaction in the event of an emergency or threat of an emergency.” In other words, from 2022 Ukraine should have been warning the EU that actions by a third party (Russia) present a threat to the transport of energy products. Obviously, none of this was done — including in this specific case.
Presumably, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Ukraine should have reacted, and in the end something was mumbled from Mykhailivska [Editor’s note: Mykhailivska Square in Kyiv, shorthand for Ukraine’s Foreign Ministry] in recent days. But: Annex XXVI clearly states that the coordinators are the Ministry of Energy of Ukraine and the member of the European Commission responsible for energy. That is, the Ministry of Energy should have taken the appropriate steps. And who is there now? The Minister of Energy, Shmyhal. And what is he known for in this case? For having defended, as prime minister, the transit of Russian oil repainted as Hungarian: “Stopping oil transit via the ‘Druzhba’ pipeline will be a direct violation by Ukraine of the Energy Charter Treaty and the Association Agreement with the EU.” Clearly, the prime minister was not aware that the EU left the Energy Charter Treaty in 2024 due to incompatibility with climate policy, and he probably did not take much account of the Association Agreement either.
That is why Ukraine is now being attacked by the Kremlin’s satrapies in Europe, and Kyiv is silent. Silent because, probably, someone is “in the know and in the share”. Maybe Che Guevara knows something… A suspect, Halushchenko… Mindich… I have repeatedly said that NABU and the SBU should have scrutinised what has been going on at Ukrtransnafta.
As for the European Commission’s position on restoring transit via “Druzhba”, it is, of course, stupid and disgraceful. Shaheds do not fly to Brussels — for now — so the thinking of the Euro-bureaucracy remains the thinking of peacetime. The war is in Ukraine. And since Kyiv did not report an emergency, while Budapest and Bratislava under Moscow’s supervision did not waste time, we have what we have.
Finally. Threats by Orbán and Fico to stop supplies of diesel fuel and electricity to Ukraine — this has already happened. Obviously diesel is no longer going, but there is no problem for us in this.
[Editor’s note: The war continues, but there is no need to overstate Ukraine’s dependence on Hungarian and Slovak diesel supplies. Their share of the market is limited — around 10 per cent — and Ukraine has already managed without them more than once, most recently last autumn, without major disruption; alternatives exist. The greater political and economic problem is in Budapest: Orbán now faces the prospect of drawing down strategic reserves while shifting to slower, costlier logistics — seaborne deliveries and pumping via Croatia — after years of claiming diversification was impossible. The irony is that the interruption was not imposed by Kyiv but triggered by Russia itself, which struck the pumping station at Brody at the end of January and stopped the flow of its own crude along Druzhba.]
[Added: On 19 February, a European Commission spokesperson said the EU was not pressuring Kyiv to resume Russian oil transit, citing Russia’s systematic destruction of Ukraine’s energy infrastructure and stating that Brussels was not setting deadlines for repairs.]
