Hungary’s incoming foreign minister has said Budapest will no longer use its EU veto as an instrument of political pressure, marking a potential shift in the country’s relations with Brussels, NATO allies and Ukraine.
Hungary’s incoming government has signalled a change in its approach to European Union decision-making, with foreign minister-designate Anita Orbán saying Budapest will no longer use its veto powers as a tool of political leverage. In remarks made ahead of an EU foreign ministers’ meeting on 11 May, she said Hungary had “too often” become an obstacle in European decision-making and had used the veto “not as a last resort but for political theatre”.
The statement follows the formation of Péter Magyar’s government after his swearing-in as Hungary’s prime minister, ending Viktor Orbán’s 16 years in power. Magyar’s Tisza party secured a large parliamentary majority in April, giving the new administration room to reshape Hungary’s domestic and European policy agenda.
Anita Orbán, who is not related to the former prime minister, said Hungary would work to regain the trust of its EU and NATO partners. Her comments suggest that the new administration wants to reduce the confrontational style that defined Budapest’s relations with Brussels under Fidesz, while retaining the right to object where it considers national interests to be directly affected.
Under the previous government, Hungary repeatedly delayed or blocked EU decisions on Ukraine, sanctions, financial support, migration, budgetary issues and rule-of-law procedures. Budapest argued that it was defending sovereign interests, but its use of unanimity rules frequently placed it at odds with other member states and contributed to prolonged disputes with EU institutions.
The change could have direct implications for EU foreign policy. Unanimity remains required in sensitive areas, including sanctions, enlargement and parts of common foreign and security policy. This has allowed individual member states to block conclusions, delay decisions or seek concessions during negotiations. A Hungarian decision to limit the use of vetoes would therefore affect several files that have been repeatedly slowed by Budapest.
For Ukraine, the shift may remove one of the recurring obstacles in its relations with the EU. Hungary has previously slowed or opposed several decisions linked to Kyiv, including assistance packages and steps connected to European integration. However, the new foreign minister-designate said Budapest would assess Ukraine’s EU path through the prism of “strict national interest” and would continue to press for additional rights for the Hungarian minority in Ukraine, particularly in relation to language and education rights in Zakarpattia. A summary of her comments stated that the new government would not abandon these demands, even if it changes the way it pursues them.
That position points to a change of method rather than a complete reversal of Hungarian policy on Ukraine. Budapest is likely to remain attentive to minority-rights questions, but the statement indicates that these issues may no longer be used in the same way to obstruct wider EU decisions.
Magyar has presented his government as pro-European and has pledged to repair relations with Brussels after years of conflict over rule-of-law concerns, corruption, public procurement, media independence and Hungary’s relations with Moscow. His administration is also expected to seek the release of EU funds that were frozen under rule-of-law procedures during the previous government. In his first address as prime minister, Magyar promised a return to the European mainstream, while also signalling institutional and anti-corruption reforms.
The political change in Budapest is likely to be closely watched in Brussels, Kyiv and NATO capitals. Hungary had often been viewed as the most difficult EU member state on Russia-related policy since the full-scale invasion of Ukraine in 2022. A more co-operative Hungarian position could make it easier for the EU to maintain common positions on sanctions, financial assistance and Ukraine’s accession process.
However, the new government is unlikely to remove all areas of friction. Magyar’s Tisza party is centre-right and has indicated that it will defend Hungarian national interests in EU negotiations. Budapest may therefore remain assertive on migration, border policy, minority rights and budgetary issues, even if it no longer uses veto threats as a regular negotiating tactic.
For now, Anita Orbán’s statement marks a clear departure from the previous government’s approach. Whether it becomes a durable change in EU decision-making will depend on Hungary’s conduct in forthcoming negotiations on Ukraine, sanctions, EU funds and institutional reform.
